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IN  THE  BEGINNING  THERE  WAS  NONE:
SUPREME  COURT  REVIEW  OF  STATE
CRIMINAL  PROSECUTIONS
Kevin C. Walsh*
INTRODUCTION
It seems obvious that the Supreme Court must have jurisdiction to
engage in direct appellate review of state criminal prosecutions that resolve
questions of federal law.  Federal questions are ubiquitous in state criminal
prosecutions.  And given the limits on federal habeas review, direct appellate
review of state decisions appears essential for the Supreme Court to exercise
its structural function of maintaining the supremacy and uniformity of fed-
eral law.  Think of cases like Mapp v. Ohio,1 Miranda v. Arizona,2 Crawford v.
Washington,3 and Maryland v. King;4 these are just a handful of the conse-
quential cases decided by the Supreme Court on direct appellate review of
state criminal prosecutions over the years.  And they are but a tiny sliver of
the massively important set of cases in which the Supreme Court has engaged
in direct appellate review of a state criminal prosecution.  Not only is such
review now routine, pervasive, and unquestioned, but it is also almost impos-
sible for anyone to imagine that the Supreme Court ever lacked appellate
jurisdiction over such cases.  For almost two centuries, indeed, nobody has.
© Kevin C. Walsh.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law.  I thank A.J. Bellia, Marc
DeGirolami, Jim Gibson, Mark Graber, Corinna Lain, Jim Lindgren, Jim Pfander, Jack
Preis, Bob Pushaw, and Steven Vladeck for comments on earlier versions of this paper.  I
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1 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule against
the states).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (imposing procedures for custodial interrogation under the
Fifth Amendment).
3 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (enforcing Sixth Amendment limits on the admission of testimo-
nial hearsay).
4 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to mandatory DNA
swabs incident to arrest).
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Until now.  This Article challenges the unquestioned assumption of all
contemporary scholars of federal jurisdiction that section 25 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 authorized Supreme Court appellate review of state criminal
prosecutions.  Section 25 has long been thought to be one of the most impor-
tant provisions of the most important jurisdictional statute enacted by Con-
gress.5  The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave concrete institutional shape to a
federal judiciary only incompletely defined by Article III.  And section 25 sup-
plied a key piece of the structural relationship between the previously
existing state court systems and the new federal court system that Congress
constructed with the Act.  It provided for Supreme Court appellate review of
certain state court decisions denying the federal-law-based rights of certain
litigants.6
5 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1499, 1529–35 (1990) (examining the relationship between “the famous Sec-
tion 25” and “the most important category of all: arising under jurisdiction”); Mark A.
Graber, James Buchanan as Savior? Judicial Power, Political Fragmentation, and the Failed 1831
Repeal of Section 25, 88 OR. L. REV. 95, 104–15 (2009) (explaining “the crucial role section
25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 played in establishing and maintaining the Supreme Court’s
power to declare state—and federal—laws unconstitutional”); Paul Taylor, Congress’s Power
to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the First Congress and the First Federal Courts Can Teach
Today’s Congress and Courts, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 847, 861 (2010) (describing section 25 as
“[o]ne of the most significant provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789”).
6 Because the text of section 25 is essential to the analysis that follows, it is set out in
full here:
SEC. 25.  And be it further enacted, That a final judgment or decree in any suit,
in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit
could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or
an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their
validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority
exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the consti-
tution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favour of such
their validity, or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the
constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United
States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially
set up or claimed by either party, under such clause of the said Constitution,
treaty, statute or commission, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in
the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error, the citation being
signed by the chief justice, or judge or chancellor of the court rendering or pass-
ing the judgment or decree complained of, or by a justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States, in the same manner and under the same regulations, and
the writ shall have the same effect, as if the judgment or decree complained of
had been rendered or passed in a circuit court, and the proceeding upon the
reversal shall also be the same, except that the Supreme Court, instead of
remanding the cause for a final decision as before provided, may at their discre-
tion, if the cause shall have been once remanded before, proceed to a final deci-
sion of the same, and award execution.  But no other error shall be assigned or
regarded as a ground of reversal in any such case as aforesaid, than such as
appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the before men-
tioned questions of validity or construction of the said constitution, treaties, stat-
utes, commissions, or authorities in dispute.
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The received understanding of section 25, tracing back almost two hun-
dred years and continuing into the present, is that the direct appellate review
authorized by Congress in that provision encompassed both civil suits and
criminal prosecutions.  Professor Akhil Amar, for example, has written that
“the Supreme Court was given plenary appellate review, under the famous
section 25, over all state court decisions which defeated rights set up by the
appellant under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.”7  And
Professor John Harrison has written that “Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 . . . provided for federal appellate jurisdiction over state criminal prose-
cutions in some circumstances.”8
This consensus understanding of section 25 dates back to the Supreme
Court’s 1821 landmark decision in Cohens v. Virginia.9  Virginia prosecuted
the Cohen brothers for selling lottery tickets for the congressionally created
Grand National Lottery without state law authorization.10  The Cohens
unsuccessfully defended on the ground that the federal statute authorizing
the tickets for this lottery preempted the state’s authority to regulate their
sale.11  Chief Justice Marshall’s issuance of a writ of error pursuant to section
25 provoked a massive jurisdictional battle—one of the most significant con-
troversies to face the Court under Chief Justice Marshall.12  But that battle
was almost exclusively about the Court’s jurisdiction under Article III.13
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87 (1789).
7 Amar, supra note 5, at 1519 (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article
III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 260–62 (1985))
(emphasis added).
8 John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the
Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 234 (1997).
9 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
10 This lottery was designed to raise money for capital improvements in the District of
Columbia.  Lotteries were an important means of raising government revenue at this time,
and states like Virginia had begun to regulate them because they diverted potential govern-
ment revenue from in state to out of state and because national lottery businesses like the
Cohens’s functioned in many ways like banks given the amount of money flowing through
them and the liquidity of the market for various lotteries’ tickets. See W. RAY LUCE, COHENS
V. VIRGINIA (1821): THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE RIGHTS 1 (1990) (noting that “[m]uch
of the nation’s capital accumulation came from lotteries, and most lottery offices per-
formed a variety of financial and banking services”); id. at 23 (explaining that Virginia’s
1819 ban on the sale of lottery tickets not authorized by Virginia was justified “as necessary
to stop a cash outflow that paid for other states’ internal improvements when similar Vir-
ginia projects faced financial difficulties”).
11 This was a potent argument coming just one year after the Supreme Court held in
McCulloch v. Maryland that states could not tax the federally incorporated (but privately
owned and operated) Second Bank of the United States. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419–24 (1819).
12 See LUCE, supra note 10, at xiv (noting that “[c]riticism of the Court and the Cohens
decision lasted more than a year and proved to be the most extensive opposition the Court
received during John Marshall’s tenure as Chief Justice”).
13 Virginia’s lawyers did argue that the Supreme Court lacked statutory jurisdiction
under section 25.  But this statutory argument did not focus on criminal prosecutions as a
category.  The argument, instead, was a repackaged version of Virginia’s argument on the
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The Court held in Cohens, as a constitutional matter, that the Supreme
Court had appellate jurisdiction to engage in direct review of state criminal
prosecutions that fit within Article III’s extension of the federal judicial
power to cases arising under federal law.  The claim that there was no statu-
tory jurisdiction in Cohens because section 25 did not encompass direct appel-
late review of state criminal prosecutions by the Supreme Court of the
United States was neither raised nor decided in the case.  Although the Court
had not previously used its statutory authority under section 25 to review a
state criminal prosecution in the thirty-plus years between the Judiciary Act of
1789 and the writ of error in Cohens, the Supreme Court’s practical extension
of section 25 review in that case was almost entirely ignored as a matter of
statutory interpretation.
With the exception of a lone constitutional lawyer from Ohio who criti-
cized the decision when it came down, no lawyer, judge, or scholar seriously
argued in the wake of Cohens v. Virginia that section 25 of the Judiciary Act
did not authorize Supreme Court review of state court criminal prosecutions.
The single—and singular—exception was the astute and once eminent (but
now obscure) Charles Hammond, who died in 1840.14  Writing in the imme-
diate aftermath of Cohens, Hammond advanced a civil-only interpretation of
section 25 in the tenth essay of a remarkable series of eleven pseudonymous
newspaper essays written under the pen name of “Hampden.”15
merits.  Virginia’s lawyers argued that the allegedly preempting federal lottery statute was
not a federal law within the meaning of section 25 because Congress enacted it as local
legislation for the District of Columbia.  The lawyers advanced this claim about the nature
of the allegedly preempting law in their arguments about jurisdiction because they had
been forbidden by the Virginia legislature from arguing the merits of the case if the Court
were to determine that it possessed jurisdiction.  The jurisdictional packaging enabled
them to make their arguments about the limited reach of the national lottery law while
respecting the limits imposed by Virginia on their Supreme Court representation of the
state.
14 Charles Hammond has been so neglected that he did not even have his own
Wikipedia before this Article was written.  I remedied that while writing this Article. See
Charles Hammond (lawyer and journalist), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=CharlesHammond_(lawyer_and_journalist)&oldid=616957675 (last visited Mar. 10,
2015).
15 CHARLES HAMMOND, REVIEW OF THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE CASE OF COHENS V. VIRGINIA (1821).  Hammond’s choice of “Hampden” was
unfortunate.  This was the same pseudonym previously adopted by Virginia judge (and
fierce Marshall Court critic) Spencer Roane in the set of critical newspaper commentaries
that led Chief Justice John Marshall himself to take to the newspapers and respond pseu-
donymously. See JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 15–16 (Gerald
Gunther ed., 1969).  Charles Warren—the former Harvard Law professor and early twenti-
eth-century author of what one scholar recently described as a “magisterial” history of sec-
tion 25’s application and “[t]he most important study on the politics of federal jurisdiction
before the Civil War”—was confused into attributing Hammond’s “Hampden” essays to
Roane. See 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY:
1821–1825, at 15 (1922) (attributing Hammond’s “Hampden” essays to Roane); Graber,
supra note 5, at 100.
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Although Hammond stood alone in staking out his civil-only interpreta-
tion of section 25 after Cohens, his arguments were not idiosyncratic when
considered against the backdrop of what came before.  When Congress
enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, there was very little reason for Congress to
have contemplated the application of federal law in state criminal prosecu-
tions.  There was no Fourteenth Amendment, and incorporation of constitu-
tional rights of criminal procedure was far beyond the horizon.  Apart from
the prohibition on ex post facto laws, Congress would not have worried about
state court circumvention of the Constitution in criminal prosecutions.  Just
five years prior to Cohens, Justice William Johnson had argued in his separate
opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee that the Supreme Court had been given
no appellate jurisdiction to review state court criminal prosecutions.16  But
this civil-only interpretation of section 25 simply disappeared after 1821.  Jus-
tice Johnson abandoned it without explanation in Cohens, everyone ignored
Hammond, and Supreme Court practice shifted quickly and irreversibly to
include direct appellate review of state court criminal prosecutions under the
jurisdiction granted in section 25.  Fights over the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction to review state court decisions flared up, but they were framed as
fights over whether to repeal section 25 or whether section 25 was constitu-
tional, rather than as fights over section 25’s correct legal meaning.17
Although Hammond’s arguments were seemingly stillborn when deliv-
ered in the summer of 1821, their continuing vitality should be apparent to
lawyers today.  This Article resurrects Hammond’s arguments and contends
that he was right: the best interpretation of section 25 is that it did not
encompass Supreme Court appellate review of state criminal prosecutions.
Others may reasonably disagree with this Article’s ultimate interpretive
conclusion about section 25’s limited reach even while acknowledging the
strength of the various supporting arguments.  Accordingly, this Article’s
basic claim comes in both a strong version and a weak version.  The strong
version has already been stated: Section 25’s authorization of Supreme Court
appellate review of state court decisions was limited to civil suits and did not
extend to criminal prosecutions.  If this strong version is correct, the
Supreme Court should have dismissed Cohens v. Virginia for lack of statutory
jurisdiction.18  The weak version is that the arguments for a civil-only inter-
16 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 377 (1816) (opinion of John-
son, J.) (“At present the uncontrollable exercise of criminal jurisdiction is most securely
confided to the state tribunals.  The courts of the United States are vested with no power to
scrutinize into the proceedings of the state courts in criminal cases . . . .”).
17 See Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United
States—A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1913)
(identifying ten federal jurisdiction-stripping proposals between 1821 and 1882).
18 With the exception of cases within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction—
which is self-executing, see James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdic-
tion in State-Party Cases, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 558 n.12 (1994)—the authority of a federal
court to exercise jurisdiction over any case depends on congressional action.  The way that
this works varies between the Supreme Court, which is created by the Constitution, and the
inferior courts, which depend on Congress for their existence.  The Supreme Court’s
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pretation of section 25 were sufficiently strong at the time of Cohens that the
Court permissibly could have dismissed for lack of statutory jurisdiction.  Even
if not demonstrably compelled by the jurisdictional statute, this disposition
would not have required any stretching of it.
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I sets out the basic arguments
from text and context that support a civil-only interpretation of section 25.
Part II addresses the strongest objections.  And Part III explores the broader
significance of the surprising rediscovery of civil-only section 25.
There is no need to prolong this introduction with previews of Parts I
and II, which one can find at the opening of those Parts.  But it is useful to
say more right here about Part III—why these arguments matter.  After all,
section 25 no longer governs.  The current statute governing Supreme Court
review of state decisions plainly encompasses both civil and criminal cases.19
And Congress will never take away that authority.  Indeed, there are argu-
ments tending to establish that Congress would not even constitutionally be
able to do so if it wanted to.
Interestingly enough, those arguments about the limits of congressional
control over federal court jurisdiction provide the first of several reasons why
a civil-only understanding of Section 25 still matters.  A standard form of
argument about congressional control over federal jurisdiction is based on
correspondence or lack of correspondence between the Judiciary Act of 1789
and Article III.  The extent of congressional control over federal jurisdiction
is precisely what Professor Amar and Professor Harrison were arguing about
in the articles quoted above on the reach of section 25.  Professor Amar and
others have argued that Article III mandates federal jurisdiction in original
or appellate form in certain types of cases,20 while Professor Harrison and
others have argued the Article III is not mandatory.21  Insofar as the first
Congress is taken to be an authority on constitutional meaning—itself a con-
tested issue—those who argue for a mandatory theory of Article III need to
appellate jurisdiction is to be understood pursuant to “[t]he principle that the affirmation
of appellate jurisdiction implies the negation of all such jurisdiction not affirmed.” Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1868).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court may
not hear an appeal unless the case fits within a statutory grant of jurisdiction that encom-
passes it.
19 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2012) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the high-
est court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is
drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or
where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Con-
stitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised
under, the United States.”).
20 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 5 at 1565–67; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power
Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of Article III, 1997
BYU L. REV. 847, 870.
21 See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 8, at 234; Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of
Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1575 (1990).
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contend with the gap between what they say Congress was constitutionally
required to authorize and what the first Congress actually did authorize.  If
the strong version of this Article’s claim is correct, then this gap is larger and
more significant than anyone until now has thought.22
Chief Justice Marshall’s perspective on the Judiciary Act of 1789 in
Cohens v. Virginia supplies an additional reason for believing it worthwhile to
get a better fix on the meaning of this foundational statute.  The non-contro-
versial existence of section 25 appellate review generally, he claimed in
Cohens, is reason to think that Supreme Court appellate review of state court
decisions on questions of federal law is constitutionally authorized.23  Mar-
shall did not think the first Congress infallible, as evidenced by his opinion
for the Court in Marbury v. Madison holding section 13 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 partially unconstitutional.  But he did understand the first Judiciary Act
as “[a] contemporaneous exposition of the constitution” of no less authority
than the Federalist Papers—which, he also said in Cohens, have “always been
considered as of great authority.”24
The path trod in this article is Chestertonian; it proceeds from the view
that “[t]he whole object of travel is not to set foot on foreign lands; it is at last
22 The suggestion that civil-only section 25 shows a larger gap between constitutionally
authorized and statutorily provided jurisdiction assumes that the Supreme Court correctly
decided in Cohens that appellate review of certain state criminal prosecutions deciding fed-
eral questions was within the Court’s jurisdiction under Article III.  For purposes of situ-
ating this Article’s excavation of civil-only section 25 in current scholarly debates, that is a
safe assumption.  At this point, it is now taken as well established that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Cohens is consistent with the original legal meaning of Article III. See Anthony
J. Bellia, Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE L.J. 263, 326–31
(2007) (situating Cohens within a broader explanation of “arising under” jurisdiction).  But
maybe that is wrong.  Maybe Congress did not provide statutory jurisdiction for Supreme
Court appellate review of these state court criminal prosecutions because it could not.  I
am not prepared to reach that conclusion on the basis of present research and am inclined
to think such a conclusion incorrect.  The best understanding still appears to be that a case
arises under federal law “[w]hen the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, by
operation of their own force, create or are otherwise determinative of a right asserted in a
case.” Id. at 331.  But the rediscovery of civil-only section 25 and of Charles Hammond as a
guide in the exploration of federal jurisdiction demonstrates the need for renewed investi-
gation of this topic.  My present working understanding with respect to Article III is that
Cohens properly liquidated the meaning of Article III, but that the alternative conclusion of
no constitutional jurisdiction would also have been a permissible (but inferior) means of
liquidating the constitutional text.
23 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 420 (1821) (“A contemporaneous
exposition of the constitution, certainly of not less authority than that which has just been
cited, is the judiciary act itself.  We know that in the Congress which passed that act were
many eminent members of the Convention which formed the constitution.  Not a single
individual, so far as is known, supposed that part of the act which gives the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction over the judgments of the State Courts in the cases therein specified,
to be unauthorized by the constitution.”).
24 Id. at 418, 420; see also id. at 418 (“It is a complete commentary on our constitution;
and is appealed to by all parties in the questions to which that instrument has given birth.
Its intrinsic merit entitles it to this high rank.”).
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to set foot on one’s own country as a foreign land.”25  Traveling the land of
federal jurisdiction through the dense underbrush of the text of section 25
brings one back to the familiar words of Article III, but now bearing a new
appreciation for the difficult problems they pose.  Careful parsing of the pre-
cise and detailed language of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides insight into
the jurisdictional thinking not only of the first Congress but also more
broadly of the legal world in which Article III was ratified.  Appreciating how
Congress very well may have actually structured the federal judiciary differ-
ently than is now commonly thought that Congress did enables insight into
how Article III may have been liquidated differently than it ultimately was.
Indeed, if the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not authorize Supreme Court appel-
late review of state criminal prosecutions, and if this had been recognized in
Cohens, the Court would not have had occasion to resolve various tensions in
Article III as it did.  Article III doctrine may have developed dramatically dif-
ferently than it did due to Cohens.  And this recognition, in turn, helps those
who wish to understand what Article III was before it became what it now is.
To paraphrase Chesterton, “the only way to go to [Article III] is to go away
from it.”26
Reflecting on the weak version of this Article’s claim also illuminates the
nature of the Marshall Court’s judicial nationalism.  Once we see that no
statutory jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions was an easily available option
for the Supreme Court in Cohens v. Virginia, we can ask: Why was this a road
not taken?  The obvious answer is that such a holding would have been
entirely unsatisfactory for a Court that was to play the strong role as the voice
of the Constitution and of the American people that Chief Justice Marshall
and his brethren envisioned in Cohens.  If the Court had held that the Consti-
tution authorized jurisdiction but Congress had not provided it, there was no
way that Congress would have provided that jurisdiction any time soon.  Yet
the Court needed jurisdiction that it could use in the present—even when
doing so would result in rulings that were likely to be disobeyed or ignored.
In the end, Cohens v. Virginia is a masterpiece of judicial craftsmanship
that has so powerfully shaped subsequent thinking about federal jurisdiction
that lawyers, judges, and scholars today cannot help but take its correctness
for granted.  The opinion so persuasively elaborates Chief Justice Marshall’s
constitutional vision for direct appellate review of state courts by the
Supreme Court that the more limited congressional vision that may actually
have been embedded in section 25 has been buried and forgotten.  If noth-
ing else, then, disinterring the arguments for civil-only section 25 provides a
better understanding of the materials that the Supreme Court’s greatest judi-
cial craftsman had to work with in Cohens v. Virginia.
And yet there is something else.  The strongest reason for believing that
the correct interpretation of section 25 still matters now is that interpreting
this foundational provision correctly matters, period.  Judicial and scholarly
25 G.K. CHESTERTON, TREMENDOUS TRIFLES 204 (3d ed. 1909).
26 Id.
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understandings of the federal judicial power rely on claims about the original
legal meaning of Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789.  And this Article’s
inquiry into the original legal meaning of section 25 takes the conventional
approach of inquiring how a reasonable lawyer versed in the Constitution,
laws, and background legal principles of the time would have understood this
provision.27  The departure from existing scholarship is not in method but in
result.  Until this Article, scholars of federal jurisdiction have uniformly
understood section 25 as encompassing both civil and criminal cases.  But if
the strong version of this Article’s basic claim is right, that until now uniform
understanding is wrong.  New editions of old books will need to be revised to
account for this interpretation, as will all accounts of the Judiciary Act of
1789 going forward.  And that is so even if many scholars ultimately accept
only the weak version of this Article’s basic claim.  The arguments for civil-
only section 25 simply cannot be ignored by anyone seeking to understand
the establishment and development of federal jurisdiction.
I. ARGUMENT
This part sets forth the affirmative case for civil-only section 25 as a mat-
ter of statutory interpretation.  The argument is primarily textual.  But while
the analysis that follows proceeds through the text piece by piece, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind how these pieces fit together, as well as how section 25
fits with the rest of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and within the legal universe of
the late eighteenth and earlier nineteenth centuries.  Before turning to elab-
oration of each part of the argument, then, it is helpful to begin with an
outline of its main pieces.
The first feature of section 25 discussed below is that it provided for a
writ of error in “any suit,” not “any case” or “any suit or prosecution.”  As used
elsewhere in the Act and as used by the same Congress, “suit” referred to civil
cases only.  The Constitution, by contrast, used the broader term “case” to
encompass both civil suits and criminal prosecutions.  And when Congress
wanted to refer to criminal prosecutions, it used “prosecution” or “proceed-
ings” in addition to (or as an alternative to) “suit.”
Second, the writ of error was available only once a suit has reached final
judgment “in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision
in the suit could be had. . . .”28  At its broadest, this language authorizes the
27 See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law
of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 453 (2011) (investigating “the original meaning of the
[Alien Tort Statute] in its historical context”); cf. John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as
Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1975 (2011) (proceeding under the “con-
ventional assumption that constitutional interpretation entails recovering or reconstruct-
ing the historically situated meaning of the constitutional text”); John O. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the
Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 751 (2009) (arguing that “the Constitu-
tion should be interpreted using the interpretive methods that the constitutional enactors
would have deemed applicable to it”).
28 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87 (1789).
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Supreme Court to review even those cases—like Cohens itself—in which the
state system provided no appeal at all.  This language invites consideration of
the jurisdictional landscape for appeals in criminal prosecutions, which
looked quite different in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
than it looks today.  There were no intrastate appeals in many criminal cases;
there was no Supreme Court appellate review in any federal criminal cases;
there was no Supreme Court appellate review in criminal cases coming out of
the D.C. courts; and there was no Supreme Court appellate review in crimi-
nal cases coming out of territorial courts.  Against this backdrop, it is conceiv-
able that section 25 nevertheless authorized Supreme Court appellate review
of state criminal prosecutions.  But it is unlikely that section 25 would have
passed without substantial critical commentary on this point—as it did—if
Congress had provided such appellate jurisdiction.
Third, section 25 provided that the writ of error shall be issued in state
court cases “in the same manner and under the same regulations” as in cases
from the federal circuit courts.29  Yet writs of error could not be issued to
circuit courts in criminal prosecutions, and were limited in civil suits by an
amount-in-controversy requirement.  As late as 1816, a Justice of the
Supreme Court described state criminal cases as beyond the reach of the
Supreme Court, and other evidence from this time also reveals a belief that
section 25’s “under the same regulations” language incorporated the
amount-in-controversy requirement applicable in cases appealed from the
circuit courts.  Even though the Supreme Court held in 1823 that section 25
did not incorporate this requirement, the Supreme Court (seemingly una-
ware of this earlier decision) later interpreted identical “in the same manner
and under the same regulations” language to foreclose Supreme Court
appellate review of criminal cases from territorial courts.
Fourth, section 25 authorized the Supreme Court itself to award execu-
tion of judgment under certain conditions.  But the Court was not granted
authority to order a new trial or authorized to issue compulsory process
against state courts, which would have been essential to ensuring execution
of judgments of reversal in criminal cases.
These textual features, singly and together, provide strong support for a
civil-only understanding of section 25.  That understanding comports with
important and widespread differences in the availability of appellate review
in civil and criminal cases in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ries.  And as we shall see, a civil-only understanding of section 25 is consistent
with both the legislative history of the Act and its pre-Cohens reception.
A. “any suit”
Section 25 authorized Supreme Court appellate review via writ of error
in “any suit, in the highest court of law or equity,” if the state court hearing
the suit decided a question of federal law against the party relying on federal
29 Id.
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law.30  In light of section 25’s limited reach to a subset of state court resolu-
tions of federal law questions, Congress probably understood this provision
to be authorized by Article III’s extension of federal judicial power to “all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority.”31  The first observation to make about section 25’s potential
reach to criminal cases, then, is that the statutory language of “any suit, in the
highest court of law or equity” is different from, and seemingly narrower
than, the constitutional language of “all cases, in law and equity.”32
The case for understanding “suits” as distinct from “cases,” and thus not
extending to include criminal prosecutions, takes its bearings from the only
contemporaneous critical commentary about Cohens v. Virginia research has
revealed that addressed section 25’s extension to criminal prosecutions.  This
is “Essay X” of Charles Hammond’s “Hampden” essays on Cohens.33  One of
Hammond’s lead arguments for a civil-only interpretation of section 25 was
that “suit” in section 25 does not include criminal cases.34  Although Ham-
mond did not break it down in precisely this fashion, this argument about
the meaning of “any suit” comes in an ordinary meaning and an intratextual
variety.  The ordinary meaning argument is that “[t]he term suit is not ordi-
narily used to describe a public prosecution.”35  The intratextual argument is
that, in every other part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, “the term suit is used in
reference to a civil and not a criminal proceeding.”36
Before turning to the intratextual evidence and then to other evidence
of how Congress used “suit” in section 25, it is important to acknowledge that
there is one inclusive but uncommon meaning of “suit” that encompasses
both civil and criminal matters.  Both this broad meaning and the more ordi-
nary, civil-only meaning can be seen in Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws
of England.  Blackstone divided his two books on “wrongs” between “private
wrongs” (Book III) and “public wrongs” (Book IV).37  Book III is largely
devoted to the “redress of private wrongs, by suit or action in the courts.”38
Book IV, by contrast, studies the criminal law, or what Blackstone called the
“pleas of the crown” because the king “is supposed by the law to be the per-
son injured by every infraction of the public rights belonging to [the] com-
munity, and is, therefore, in all cases, the proper prosecutor for every public
30 Id.  This formulation oversimplifies in describing the characteristics of covered state
court decisions vis-a`-vis the Constitution, federal law, and treaties, but the simplification is
not material to the portion of statutory text relevant for this argument.  For the full text,
see supra note 6.
31 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
32 Id.
33 CHARLES HAMMOND, No. X, in REVIEW OF THE OPINION, supra note 15, at 51–55
[hereinafter Hampden X].
34 See id. at 53, 54.
35 Id. at 52.
36 Id. at 53.
37 See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
38 Id. at *3.
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offense.”39  Blackstone’s discussion of the various processes for enforcing the
criminal law is titled “Of the Several Modes of Prosecution.”40  There is some
overlap between the idea of “suit” and “prosecution,” as Blackstone describes
processes like indictment and presentment as “methods of prosecution at the
suit of the king,”41 and he also uses the phrase “criminal suit” in describing a
prosecution initiated by information.  Moreover, Blackstone notes that one
method of enforcing certain penal statutes was a qui tam “suit,” in which an
informer would bring “suit” to recover a penalty or portion of a penalty due
for the commission of a public wrong.42  But despite the possibility of a broad
use of “suit” to include the idea of a “criminal suit,” the much more common
term for actions to enforce criminal laws in Blackstone’s Commentaries is
“prosecution.”  And the claim of this Section is that, although it is conceiva-
ble that Congress used “suit” inclusively to extend to criminal prosecutions as
well as civil cases, the better conclusion is that Congress used the word to
encompass civil cases only.
We begin, then, with the intratextual evidence, which provides strong
but not unequivocal support for a civil-only meaning of “suit” in section 25.
The strongest intratextual evidence comes from section 35 of the Act, which
distinguishes “suits” from “prosecutions” in describing the office of United
States Attorney.43  As used in this part of section 35, “suits” corresponds to
“civil actions” while “prosecutions” refers to “crimes and offences.”44
The next strongest intratextual evidence comes from sections 12 and 31.
Each of these sections appears to use “suit” to encompass civil cases alone.
Section 12 provides for removal of “a suit . . . commenced in any state court
39 4 id. at *2.
40 Id. at *301.
41 Id. at *312.
42 3 id. at *162.
43 This section creates the offices of Attorney General and United States Attorney and
specifies the duties of these offices. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93
(1789).
44 See id. (“[T]here shall be appointed in each district a meet person learned in the
law to act as attorney for the United States in such district, whose duty it shall be to prose-
cute in such district all delinquents for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of
the United States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned, except
before the supreme court in the district in which that court shall be holden.  And he shall
receive as a compensation for his services such fees as shall be taxed therefor in the respec-
tive courts before which the suits or prosecutions shall be.” (emphases added)).  Another
part of section 35 that arguably cuts the other way is the description of the Attorney Gen-
eral’s duties as including the conduct of “all suits in the Supreme Court in which the
United States shall be concerned.”  If this authorization included the conduct of criminal
cases, then Congress used “suits” broadly to encompass both civil and criminal matters.
Because there was no appellate jurisdiction granted in federal criminal prosecutions, any
criminal matters would have to have been in the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.
Section 13 did provide the Supreme Court with exclusive original jurisdiction over crimi-
nal matters against ambassadors, other public ministers, and so on.  But section 13 accom-
plished this by providing for Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction of “suits or proceedings
against . . . public ministers.” Id. § 13, 1 Stat. at 80.
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against an alien, or by a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought
against a citizen of another state, and the matter in dispute exceeds the afore-
said sum or value of five hundred dollars.”45  The imposition of an amount-
in-controversy requirement provides a strong indication that this language
encompasses only civil cases.46  The remainder of the provision augments the
strength of this supposition, requiring “surety” (in all cases) and “special bail”
(in some cases), and setting forth the effect of “any attachment of the goods
or estate of the defendant by the original process.”47  All of these procedural
requirements suggest a limitation to civil cases.48  As the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court unanimously opined when interpreting this section in 1798,
although the word ‘suit’ is used generally in the 12th section, without expres-
sing the words ‘of a civil nature,’ yet the slightest consideration of what fol-
lows, manifestly shews that no other suit was meant; for the matter in dispute
must exceed five hundred dollars in value, special bail must be given, &c.
terms applicable to actions of a civil nature only.49
Section 31 provides for substitution of an executor or administrator
“where any suit shall be depending in any court of the United States, and
either of the parties dies before final judgment,” and the action survives.
This provision uses “suit” to encompass civil cases only, for the prosecuting
party in a criminal prosecution is not a natural person who can die (and
therefore needs to be replaced), while the death of a criminal defendant
terminates the prosecution (rather than resulting in continuation against a
substitute).
The remaining intratextual evidence about the meaning of “suit” is
mixed.  But nothing plainly contradicts Hammond’s claim that, all through-
out the Judiciary Act, “the term suit is used in reference to a civil and not a
criminal proceeding.”50
The strongest contrary textual argument is the use elsewhere in the Act
of phrases such as “civil suit” and “suit of a civil nature.”51  The presence of
these civil-only modifiers could suggest that, in their absence, “suit” would
encompass not only civil suits and suits of a civil nature but also criminal suits
45 Id. § 12, 1 Stat. at 79.
46 See, e.g., United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 173–74 (1805) (“The words,
‘matter in dispute,’ seem appropriated to civil cases, where the subject in contest has a
value beyond the sum mentioned in the act.  But, in criminal cases, the question is the guilt
or innocence of the accused.  And although he may be fined upwards of [the amount-in-
controversy requirement], yet that is, in the eye of the law, a punishment for the offence
committed, and not the particular object of the suit.”).
47 Judiciary Act § 12, 1 Stat. at 79–80.
48 “Special bail, also known as ‘bail above’ or ‘bail to the action,’ was based on persons
promising to be responsible for the damages and costs assessed against a defendant if he
lost in court and did not himself pay or surrender himself as a prisoner.”  4 THE DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 242 (Maeva
Marcus ed., 1992) [hereinafter 4 DHSC] (citations omitted).
49 Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 467, 474–75 (Pa. 1798) (emphasis omitted).
50 Hampden X, supra note 33, at 53.
51 See, e.g., Judiciary Act § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79.
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or suits of a criminal nature.52  There is also one candidate for the Judiciary
Act’s use of “suit” unmodified to include both civil and criminal cases.  This is
the use of “suit” at the end of section 9, which sets forth the original jurisdic-
tion of federal district courts.  Among other things, section 9 provided for
exclusive district court jurisdiction over “crimes and offences” carrying pun-
ishments below certain levels, as well as “all suits against consuls or vice-con-
suls, except for offences above the description aforesaid.”53  The carve out
from “all suits” of “offences” that carried a heavier punishment than those
described earlier in the section suggests that “all suits” might otherwise
encompass “all offences” in the absence of a carve out.54
Another intratextual comparison to note is the contrast between section
22’s description of those circuit court cases the Supreme Court could review
and section 25’s description of those state court cases the Supreme Court
could review.  Section 22 authorizes review of “final judgments and decrees
in civil actions, and suits in equity in a circuit court,”55 while section 25
authorizes review of “a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest
court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be
had.”56  One might argue that the transition in section 25 to “final judgment
or decree in any suit” is designed to encompass more than “civil actions.”57
There is admitted force to this argument.  But one might respond that the
more relevant contrast is between section 25’s “any suit, in the highest court
of law or equity,” and section 22’s “suits in equity in a circuit court,” such that
section 25 expands the category of suits beyond equity rather than draws on a
contrast between the narrower formulation “civil action” and the allegedly
broader formulation “any suit.”
In the end, there is only so much that one can make out from the
intratextual evidence.  When one casts a broader net in search of the ordi-
nary meaning of the term at the time, however, one sees that “suit” was not
ordinarily used to describe a criminal prosecution.  That is, one would not
52 Robert Pushaw has argued, for example, that “[t]he Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . uses
‘civil’ in every instance where Congress intended to limit jurisdiction to civil matters.”
Pushaw, supra note 20, at 870 n.100 (internal citations omitted).  That claim is inconsistent
with this Article’s explication of “suit” as used in sections 12, 31, and 35.
53 Judiciary Act § 9, 1 Stat. at 77.
54 John Harrison has interpreted this language in a way that includes criminal prosecu-
tions as “offences” within the carve out from “all suits.” See Harrison, supra note 8, at 237
(“Although one might wonder whether suits include criminal prosecutions, the exclusion
of criminal offenses with a punishment above the stated level strongly indicates that a pros-
ecution with potential punishment below that level would be within the jurisdiction.”).  A
potential line of response that requires further exploration is whether Harrison’s assimila-
tion of “offences” to “criminal prosecutions” is too hasty because there are some “offences”
would have been addressed in civil actions.  Some offences at the time could have been
pursued via qui tam information, which would have been a civil action.  And there were
also some civil suits by government officials seeking penalties. McCulloch v. Maryland, for
example, was a debt action.
55 Judiciary Act § 22, 1 Stat. at 84.
56 Id. at 85–87.
57 I thank Jim Pfander for highlighting this argument for me.
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have typically described a proceeding initiated by indictment in 1789 as a
suit.  In this respect, not much has changed.  No state prosecutor now will be
overheard talking about a prosecution as a “suit.”
Several scholars have previously contended that the distinction in Article
III between the use of “cases” and “controversies” signals a difference
between the broader category of “cases” that included both criminal and civil
actions and the narrower civil-only category of “controversies.”58  Less well
known, however, is a similar distinction between “cases” and “suits.”  This
distinction appears in Judge Edmund Pendleton’s opinion in the 1782 Vir-
ginia case of Commonwealth v. Caton.59  This case involved interpretation of a
jurisdictional statute with three branches.  The first branch used the term
“suits,” the second used “controversy” (and also included an amount-in-con-
troversy requirement), while the third used “cases.”  Judge Pendleton rea-
soned that “[i]n the two first branches, the terms suits and controversies are
used, in terms proper to describe disputes between litigant parties, and
would seem to exclude criminal cases . . . . But, in the third branch, those
terms are dropt, and the more general one of cases adopted.”60  According
to Pendleton, this more general term “cases” included both civil and criminal
matters.61
This civil-only meaning of “suit” appears not only in the Judiciary Act,
but also in the provisions that became the Sixth and Seventh Amendments,
which were proposed for ratification by Congress one day after the Judiciary
Act.  The Sixth Amendment applies “[i]n all criminal prosecutions.”62  The
Seventh Amendment, by contrast, applies “[i]n [s]uits at common law, where
the value of the controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.”63  The Sixth
Amendment covers criminal cases, while the Seventh Amendment does not.
And a few years later, Congress used “suit” to encompass civil cases only when
it drafted the language that became the Eleventh Amendment.  That Amend-
ment, which is an instruction about how to construe the jurisdictional grants
58 See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 8, at 221–30; Meltzer, supra note 21, at 1575; Pfander,
supra note 18, at 604–09.  Robert Pushaw critiques this civil/criminal distinction in Pushaw,
supra note 20, at 864–73, and Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction
and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1994).  Pushaw con-
tends instead that the two words “cases” and “controversies” identified two different judi-
cial functions: “The federal courts’ principal function in Article III ‘Cases’ was to expound
laws having national and international significance, whereas their main role in ‘Controver-
sies’ was to act as an impartial arbitrator.”  Pushaw, supra note 20, at 864–65.  This Article
does not take a position on who has the best of this debate with respect to the meaning of
Article III.  At a minimum, the evidence indicates that some important legal thinkers in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries distinguished “controversies” and “cases” in
a way that understood “controversies” to encompass civil cases only and “cases” also to
include criminal cases.
59 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782).  I am grateful to Jim Pfander for steering me to this case.
60 Id. at 14.
61 Id.
62 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
63 Id. amend. VII.
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in Article III, applies to “any suit in law or equity.”  Its phrase “any suit”
encompasses only civil cases, because the Eleventh Amendment’s prohibition
covers suits only if “commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by [c]itizens of another [s]tate, or by [c]itizens or [s]ubjects of any
[f]oreign [s]tate.”64
Another civil-only usage of “suit” to consider from the first Congress
appears in the Process Act of 1789.  In the Process Act, Congress generally
provided that federal courts would adopt state procedures in “suits at com-
mon law.”  The Process Act, however, was not taken to regulate federal court
procedure in federal criminal prosecutions.65
A final important civil-only usage of “suit” to consider is in the first fed-
eral officer removal statute, which was enacted in 1815.  Congress enacted
this law “to extend the Judiciary Act of 1789 to ensure enforcement of the
federal customs laws in the face of [state court] decisions misconstruing fed-
eral law.”66  Although the problems behind the passage of this law were lim-
ited to civil cases, Congress provided for removal of both “suits” and
“prosecutions.”67  Congress plainly used “prosecutions” to mean criminal
prosecutions, as is evident from its prohibition on the state appealing an
acquittal of a defendant in state court.68  A reasonable inference is that
“suits” alone would have been limited to civil cases.
B. “in the highest court of law or equity of a state in which a decision
in the suit could be had”
The next chunk of statutory text to consider limits the state court suits in
which a writ of error is available from the Supreme Court of the United
States to those suits in which there has been a final judgment or decree “in
the highest court of law or equity of a state in which a decision in the suit
64 Id. amend. XI.  The “prosecuted” language in the Eleventh Amendment was
intended to sweep in cases that had already been commenced, to make clear that, upon
ratification, then-pending suits within the description of the Amendment could not be
continued in federal court.
65 See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 618 (1971) (explaining that, in federal criminal
cases, “procedural questions were argued and settled at Circuit on the basis of English
common law precedents,” with only “occasional reference to state statutes, and even rarer
inquiries into what state practice might be”).
66 Kenneth S. Rosenblatt, Removal of Criminal Prosecutions of Federal Officials: Returning to
the Original Intent of Congress, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 21, 30 (1989).
67 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 758–61 (1814); see also 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FINANCE
1802–15 § 435, at 881 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds., Washington, Gales
& Seaton 1814) (noting that “limited as the general powers of the revenue officers appear
to be, they are rendered still more inadequate by the terror . . . of being exposed to suits
for damages”).
68 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 758–61; see also Rosenblatt, supra note 66, at 31 n.39 (noting
that “the text of the Act indicates that Congress intended ‘prosecutions’ to mean criminal
prosecutions”).
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could be had.”69  This provision ensures that the suit has received the fullest
consideration available in the state system before the questions of federal law
at issue in the suit become eligible for Supreme Court review.  The provision
had to be worded as it was because Congress recognized that different kinds
of suits would receive different levels of consideration in the various state
systems.  While the wording is inclusive, it is also a pointer toward Congress’s
awareness of the diversity of systems for appellate review in the states.  And
many of those systems provided very limited appellate review in criminal
cases.
The first clue that criminal cases stand differently from civil cases with
respect to appeals comes from a feature of Cohens v. Virginia that sometimes
puzzles people coming to the case for the first time today.  That is the iden-
tity of the court from which the case came to the Supreme Court—the quar-
terly session court for Norfolk, Virginia.70  Virginia law did not then provide
for any appellate review of that court’s decision to fine the Cohen brothers
$100 plus expenses.  While it is certainly possible that Congress drafted sec-
tion 25 to provide for cases to proceed directly to the Supreme Court in this
fashion, it is worth pausing over this feature of Cohens to consider how much
of an outlier the sort of inter-system appellate review performed in that crimi-
nal prosecution was when viewed together with other state and federal provi-
sions limiting appellate review in criminal prosecutions.
Today’s interpreters inhabit a world in which Supreme Court appellate
review of criminal matters from both federal and state courts is routine.  But
states in the late eighteenth century varied significantly in their respective
approaches to appellate review in criminal cases, and the absence of as-of-
right appellate review in some state systems was consistent with the limited
availability of appellate review at common law.  Moreover, the Judiciary Act of
1789 did not provide for Supreme Court appellate review of federal criminal
cases; the D.C. Organic Act did not provide for Supreme Court appellate
review of criminal cases from the D.C. circuit courts either; and Congress
later followed the same pattern of not authorizing Supreme Court appellate
review of criminal cases decided in territories.71
The lack of any intra-system appellate review in Virginia was noted
shortly after the decision in Cohens, albeit for a different purpose.  In later
criticism of the Supreme Court decision, one of Chief Justice Marshall’s most
relentless critics, Judge Spencer Roane of Virginia, charged in one of his
pseudonymous essays in the Richmond Enquirer that the path of the case from
the borough court straight to the Supreme Court showed that the case was
69 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (1789).
70 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 448 (1821) (“This cause came on to
be heard on the transcript of the record of the Quarterly Session Court for the Borough of
Norfolk, in the Commonwealth of Virginia . . . .”).
71 There are, of course, reasons why inter-system review would be warranted when
intra-system review would not be.  In particular, Congress reasonably could have intended
such inter-system review as a way of providing federal protection for federal interests.  This
consideration is addressed in more detail infra Section II.A.
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“feigned” in some way.72  Taking note of this criticism, Chief Justice Marshall
wrote a few days later to the Supreme Court’s reporter, Henry Wheaton, ask-
ing him to add a footnote to the reported case stating that an appeal had
been sought and refused.73  He wrote to Wheaton that
I hope it is not too late to make an asterisk at that part of the opinion which
states it to be the judgment of a court of the last resort & insert in a note
some such words as these, “Cohens prayed an appeal from this judgement
but it was refused on the principle that there was no higher tribunal which
could take cognizance of the case.”74
Wheaton inserted the footnote as requested.75
While the Chief Justice’s quick response to newspaper criticism of the
opinion is interesting in its own right, the more notable feature of this epi-
sode for present purposes is to highlight the disjunction between the state
and federal systems in providing for appellate review.  If section 25 reached
criminal prosecutions like this one, then it provided for greater inter-system
review than was provided on an intra-system basis in Virginia itself.  As far as
research has revealed, however, this disjunction was not deemed worthy of
comment at the time of enactment or in the lead up to or the aftermath of
Cohens.  Perhaps this was due to a belief that state prosecutions presented a
need for Supreme Court (or some other federal court) review that federal
criminal prosecutions did not present because federal criminal prosecutions
already took place in a federal court.  Or maybe everyone’s attention was
focused on constitutional jurisdiction instead of statutory jurisdiction.
The absence of intra-system appellate review for the Cohen brothers’
conviction and fine in Virginia was not a quirk of that Commonwealth’s law.
Although the differing structure of state judiciaries (both synchronically and
diachronically) makes deep generalizations about state practice in the late
eighteenth century difficult,76 appellate review had long been limited in
criminal matters.  At common law, a writ of error was generally available for
misdemeanor convictions but not available as of right for felony convic-
tions.77  And as Hammond noted in his Hampden essays, Virginia was not
72 See Algernon Sidney, On the Lottery Decision: No. 2, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, May 29,
1821, reprinted in 2 JOHN P. BRANCH HISTORICAL PAPERS OF RANDOLPH-MACON COLLEGE 91,
92–93 (William E. Dodd, ed., 1906).
73 See Letter of John Marshall to Henry Wheaton (June 2, 1821), reprinted in 9 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 150 (Charles Hobson, ed., 1998).  Marshall would have been
familiar with the course of proceedings in Cohens because the writ of error had been issued
under his signature.
74 Id.
75 See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 376 n.a (“The plaintiff in error prayed an appeal
from the judgment of the Court of Hustings, but it was refused, on the ground that there
was no higher State tribunal which could take cognizance of the case.”).
76 See David Rossman, “Were There No Appeal”: The History of Review in American Criminal
Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518, 525 (1990).
77 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *391–92; see also GOEBEL, supra note 65, at 610 &
n.9 (describing the foregoing discussion by Blackstone as “the book learning about com-
mon law limitations upon the availability of the writ [of error] in criminal cases”).
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the only state that followed “the policy of restricting the operation of writs of
error, in prosecutions for offences against the state.”78  Finally, even when a
criminal defendant could obtain a writ of error for state court appellate
review, that review was much more limited than in appeals today.  Writ of
error review did not encompass any factual questions and was limited to cer-
tain legal defects appearing on the face of the record.79
Section 25’s provision for review via writ of error, rather than an appeal
(which would have allowed for reconsideration of questions of both fact and
law), was a response to concern about the ability of the Supreme Court to
revisit factual as well as legal questions.  The Seventh Amendment’s Reexami-
nation Clause also addresses this concern by providing that, in certain suits,
“no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any [c]ourt of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”80  But while
the Seventh Amendment was proposed by the same Congress that enacted
the Judiciary Act of 1789, it was only a proposal that had yet to be ratified.
Interestingly, the Sixth Amendment contains no provision about appel-
late review analogous to the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause.
The explanation cannot be that people were worried about Supreme Court
appellate reexamination of fact only in civil cases; if the Court could exercise
appellate jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions, the same worries would
have been expressed.  A more likely explanation is the anticipated absence of
federal appellate review in federal criminal prosecutions, at least under the
Judiciary Act of 1789.81  Whatever the reason for this difference between the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments—namely, that only the Seventh addresses a
concern about appellate review—the different treatment is consistent with
different approaches to appellate review in civil and criminal cases at the
time more generally.
Although Cohens is an odd case because it provided for federal inter-
system appellate review when there was no state intra-system appellate review,
that is not the only oddity about the case.  Another unusual feature of Cohens
is that the Supreme Court used section 25 to engage in federal inter-system
appellate review in a category of case—criminal prosecutions—for which
78 CHARLES HAMMOND, No. VIII, in REVIEW OF THE OPINION, supra note 15, at 42.
79 See Rossman, supra note 76, at 525.
80 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
81 In the context of arguing about the absence of constitutional authority for a federal
common law of crimes, James Madison argued in 1800 that Article III’s extension of the
federal judicial power to “all cases, in law and equity, arising under” federal law was “mani-
festly confined to cases of a civil nature; and would exclude cases of criminal jurisdiction.”
James Madison, Mr. Madison’s Report to the Virginia General Assembly, Jan. 7, 1800, in VIRGINIA
COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, WE THE STATES: AN ANTHOLOGY OF HIS-
TORIC DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARIES THEREON, EXPOUNDING THE STATE AND FEDERAL
RELATIONSHIP 157, 191–92 (1964).  In support of this claim, Madison argued not only that
“[c]riminal cases in law and equity, would be a language unknown to the law,” but also that
the provision for Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction as to law and fact in cases of law and
equity arising under the Constitution “clearly excludes criminal cases where the trial by
jury is secured; because the fact, in such cases, is not a subject of appeal.” Id. at 192–93.
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there would have been no federal intra-system appellate review.  In fact, an
important civil/criminal distinction that runs through the Judiciary Act of
1789 is its provision for federal intra-system appellate review by the Supreme
Court of some civil cases but no criminal cases.
Section 22 of the Act explicitly authorized Supreme Court review of
“final judgments and decrees in civil actions, and suits in equity in a circuit
court,” subject to a two thousand dollar amount-in-controversy require-
ment.82  There is no explicit provision in the Act one way or the other for
writs of error with respect to federal circuit court criminal cases.83  But the
Supreme Court determined in 1805 that section 22’s “affirmative description
of [the Court’s powers] must be understood as a regulation, under the con-
stitution, prohibiting the exercise of other powers than those described.”84
Later explaining the Judiciary Act of 1789’s denial of Supreme Court appel-
late review in federal circuit court criminal cases, Justice Story wrote that “the
denial of this authority proceeded upon great principles of public policy and
convenience.  If every party had a right to bring before this Court every case,
in which judgment had passed against him, for a crime or misdemeanor or
felony, the course of justice might be materially delayed and obstructed, and,
in some cases, totally frustrated.”85
82 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84–85 (emphasis added) (providing
that “final judgments and decrees in civil actions, and suits in equity in a circuit court,
brought there by original process, or removed there from courts of the several States, or
removed there by appeal from a district court where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum
or value of two thousand dollars, exclusive of costs, [may] be re-examined and reversed or
affirmed in the Supreme Court”).  This provision further requires issuance of a citation
signed by a judge sitting on a circuit court or a Supreme Court Justice, and it provides that
“every justice or judge signing a citation on any writ of error . . . shall take good and
sufficient security, that the plaintiff in error shall prosecute his writ to effect, and answer all
damages and costs if he fail to make his plea good.” Id. at 85.
83 See Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38, 42 (1822) (“[T]his Court has no appel-
late jurisdiction confided to it in criminal cases, by the laws of the United States.  It cannot
entertain a writ of error, to revise the judgment of the Circuit Court, in any case where a
party has been convicted of a public offence.”).
84 United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 159, 173 (1805).  The jurisdictional law at
issue in this case was the 1801 Organic Act of the District of Columbia.  But the language
quoted in the text above is a statement about section 22 of the First Judiciary Act.  The
decision in More and the significance of the Court’s interpretation of the jurisdictional
grant in the D.C. Organic Act are considered in more detail below.
85 Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 42.  Despite the absence of Supreme Court
appellate review in federal criminal cases, the federal system nevertheless came to include
a means for obtaining Supreme Court review of legal questions that arose in the course of
such cases.  The Judiciary Act of 1802 authorized the certification of questions to the
Supreme Court when the circuit court was divided in its opinion. See Rossman, supra note
76, at 563.  This kind of certification was not available from state courts to federal courts,
however, and it is probably anachronistic to even consider it to have been a live possibility.
It was not until 1889 that Congress granted the right of appeal by writ of error in a criminal
case, but this was only in capital crimes. See Lester B. Orfield, Early Federal Criminal Proce-
dure, 7 WAYNE L. REV. 503, 528–29 (1961).
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Given the absence of Supreme Court appellate review of federal circuit
court criminal cases and the limited availability of appellate review by a state’s
highest court in state criminal cases, it is perhaps unsurprising that Congress
in 1801 did not provide for Supreme Court appellate review of criminal cases
when it first created the new circuit court for the District of Columbia.  The
D.C. Act gave the newly created circuit court for the District of Columbia
cognizance of “all crimes and offences” committed in the district, “all cases in
law and equity” involving at least one district resident, “all actions or suits of a
civil nature at common law or in equity” in which the United States were
“plaintiffs,” and “all seizures on land or water, and all penalties and forfeit-
ures made, arising or accruing under the laws of the United States.”86  The
D.C. Act further provided that the Supreme Court could engage in appellate
review (via writ of error or appeal) of “any final judgment, order or decree in
said circuit court, wherein the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall
exceed the value of one hundred dollars.”87
Although there was no statutory language explicitly confining this appel-
late review to civil cases, the Supreme Court soon held that the appellate
jurisdiction granted by the D.C. Act was “confined to civil cases.”88  On behalf
of a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Marshall explained in United States v.
More that for Congress to provide for appellate jurisdiction in this one class of
cases was to exclude appellate jurisdiction in cases not mentioned: “as the
jurisdiction of the court has been described, it has been regulated by con-
gress, and an affirmative description of its powers must be understood as a
regulation, under the constitution, prohibiting the exercise of other powers
than those described.”89  Marshall next elaborated this principle with the
example of section 22 of the First Judiciary Act, discussed above.  Section 22
authorized the Supreme Court to issue a writ of error in federal circuit court
cases in which the amount in controversy exceeded two thousand dollars.
Marshall stated that Congress’s grant of authority to review cases above that
amount implied the denial of authority to review cases below that amount
even though “[t]here are no words in the act restraining the supreme court
from taking cognizance of causes under that sum.”90  Marshall next enunci-
ated the interpretive principle that “[t]his court, therefore, will only review
those judgments of the circuit court of Columbia, a power to reexamine
which, is expressly given by law.”91  Appellate jurisdiction over D.C. circuit
court criminal cases was not “expressly given by law,” Marshall concluded,
because “[t]he words, ‘matter in dispute,’ seem appropriated to civil cases.”92
He explained that, “in criminal cases, the question is the guilt or innocence
of the accused.  And although he may be fined upwards of 100 dollars, yet
86 An Act Concerning the District of Columbia, ch. 15, 2 Stat. 103, 106 (1801).
87 Id.
88 More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) at 173.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 173–74.
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that is, in the eye of the law, a punishment for the offence committed, and
not the particular object of the suit.”93
Although the foregoing context about limited availability of appellate
review in criminal cases supports a civil-only interpretation of section 25, one
could argue that the inclusive language discussed in this section actually cuts
strongly the other way.  The argument would be that this obviously inclusive
language was used precisely so that there would be Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over categories of cases like criminal prosecutions in which states
did not provide for appellate review.94  This is a powerful argument, to be
sure, but in support of an inference about criminal prosecutions, it runs into
Congress’s use of “prosecutions” in addition to “suits” when Congress specifi-
cally intended to include criminal prosecutions (in section 35) as well as the
arguments against inferring inclusion of criminal prosecutions from silence
about them.95
C. “under the same regulations . . . as if the judgment or decree complained of
had been rendered or passed in a circuit court”
The Supreme Court’s treatment of the D.C. court amount-in-controversy
requirement in United States v. More provides a window into the meaning of
section 25’s language providing for the issuance of a writ of error “in the
same manner and under the same regulations . . . as if the judgment or
decree complained of had been rendered or passed in a circuit court.”  As
previously noted, the Judiciary Act of 1789 nowhere authorized the Supreme
Court to issue a writ of error to a federal circuit court in a criminal case.  And
with respect to Supreme Court appellate review of civil cases in the federal
circuit courts—addressed in section 22—Congress provided a two thousand
dollar amount-in-controversy limitation.  As More instructs, such a limitation
is a “regulation” of jurisdiction.  The question then becomes: Did Congress
incorporate section 22’s amount-in-controversy requirement into section 25
by means of the requirement that writs of error be issued to state courts
“under the same regulations” as to circuit courts?
The idea that section 25’s “under the same regulations” language may
have incorporated section 22’s amount-in-controversy requirement does not
appear to have been addressed by anybody since the 1820s.  As a doctrinal
matter, the Supreme Court killed the idea in its 1823 decision of Buel v. Van
Ness.96  The Supreme Court held in Buel that section 25’s “in the same man-
ner, and under the same regulations” language did not incorporate the
amount-in-controversy limitation of section 22.97  Writing for the Court, Jus-
tice Johnson stated that incorporating section 22’s amount-in-controversy
93 Id. at 174.
94 I am indebted to A.J. Bellia for highlighting the force of this objection.
95 The section 35 argument is addressed in Section I.A above, and the arguments
about inferences from silence are addressed in Section II.A below.
96 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 312 (1823).
97 Id. at 318.
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limitation into section 25 via the “same regulations” language of that provi-
sion ignores the context of this language:
It is obvious from the context, as well as from its ordinary meaning and use,
that its proper bearing is altogether confined to the writ of error, citation,
&c. to be issued in a case which has been before fully defined, and not that it
should itself enter into the descriptive circumstances by which those cases
are to be identified, to which the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is to be
extended.98
Justice Johnson also appealed to the different purposes of section 22 and
section 25: “Questions of mere meum and tuum, are those to which the 22d
section relates; but those intended to be provided for by the 25th section, are
noticed only for their national importance, and are deemed proper for an
appellate tribunal, from the principles, not the sums, that they involve.”99
Justice Johnson’s reasoning in Buel has some force to it.  But it is more
persuasive with respect to “same manner” than “same regulations,” and it is
far from conclusive.  Even though section 22 and section 25 admittedly have
somewhat different purposes, Justice Johnson’s opinion in Buel does not
address just which “regulations” from section 22 are incorporated by section
25’s language if not the amount-in-controversy requirement.  Consider, for
example, the requirement for the justice signing the writ of error to “take
good and sufficient security, that the plaintiff in error shall prosecute his writ
to effect, and answer all damages and costs if he fail to make his plea
good.”100  Is this a regulation of jurisdiction incorporated from section 22
into section 25?  If so, how would it apply in a criminal case?
Consider, also, Justice Johnson’s separate opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee, decided just five years before Cohens.  In that case, Justice Johnson
explicitly differentiated between the Supreme Court’s ability to review state
court decisions in civil cases and in criminal cases.  Although agreeing with
the rest of the Court that section 25 authorized the Supreme Court to engage
in appellate review via writ of error to state courts in civil cases, Johnson
stated that “[t]he courts of the United States are vested with no power to
scrutinize into the proceedings of the state courts in criminal cases.”101  He
observed that “[a]t present the uncontrollable exercise of criminal jurisdic-
tion is most securely confided to the state tribunals.”102  Justice Johnson’s
opinion seemingly left open the possibility that such jurisdiction would be
within the constitutional power of Congress to grant, but he wrote that “[a]t
present it is only necessary to vindicate the laws which [the general govern-
ment has] passed affecting civil cases pending in state tribunals.”103  Neither
in Cohens nor in Buel (nor anywhere else uncovered by research) does Justice
Johnson explain how his views about Supreme Court jurisdiction to engage
98 Id. at 322–23 (emphasis omitted).
99 Id. at 323.
100 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 85.
101 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 377 (1816) (emphasis added).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 377–78.
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in appellate review of state court criminal prosecutions had changed between
1816 and 1821.  Nor has anyone else offered an argument justifying Justice
Johnson’s switch.
Justice Johnson was not alone in his 1816 civil-only understanding of
section 25.  Writing to the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee near the end of 1814, Alexander Dallas—the first (unofficial) Supreme
Court reporter, Secretary of the Commonwealth in Pennsylvania from 1791
to 1801, United States Attorney in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania from
1801 to 1814, Secretary of the Treasury from 1814 to 1816, and acting Secre-
tary of State and Secretary of War for several months in 1815—went even
further than Johnson in a civil-only understanding of section 25.  Dallas
expressly interpreted section 25 to incorporate section 22’s two thousand dol-
lar amount-in-controversy requirement.  This issue was important to Dallas
because he was seeking legislation that would authorize removal of certain
actions from state court into federal court.  The immediate problem that Dal-
las needed removal authority to address was difficulty enforcing federal reve-
nue laws in Vermont.  As Dallas explained, the general powers of federal
revenue officers to deal with smuggling were limited, and those powers were
rendered still more inadequate by the terror which the officers now feel, of
being exposed to suits for damages, under the authority of recent decisions
in the courts of law; for it has been adjudged in Vermont, that the inspectors
of the customs are not authorized, in any case, to make seizures, and that
actions may be maintained against them, to recover the whole value of the
property seized, even when the property itself has been duly condemned, as
forfeited by law.104
In explaining why new removal authority was necessary, Dallas described
existing legal protections as inadequate.  Among those legal protections was
Supreme Court appellate review via writ of error, but as Dallas described this
provision, “the matter in dispute must exceed the value of two thousand dol-
lars, exclusive of costs.”105
Although Dallas’s reading of section 25 differed from the reading even-
tually adopted by the Supreme Court in Buel, his apparent understanding of
the legal effect of “under the same regulations” language was vindicated in a
later decision by the Supreme Court involving that same language in a differ-
ent statute.  We have already seen that Congress did not provide for Supreme
Court appellate review of federal criminal cases or criminal cases in the D.C.
courts.  Congress followed the same pattern when it provided for Supreme
Court authority to issue writs of error to territorial courts (as in Utah, Wash-
ington, and Montana, for example).  The jurisdictional statutes for the terri-
tories, like the jurisdictional statute for the District of Columbia, provided
that the Supreme Court was to review the judgments and decrees of these
courts “in the same manner and under the same regulations” provided as to
104 Letter from A.J. Dallas to J.W. Effes (Nov. 19, 1814), reprinted in 3 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS (FINANCE) (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds., Washington, Gales &
Seaton 1814) 881, 881–82.
105 Id.
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the final judgments and decrees of the federal circuit courts.106  In the 1889
case of Farnsworth v. Montana, the Supreme Court interpreted this language
to encompass the amount-in-controversy regulations, which in turn excluded
criminal cases from review:
In all these prior statutes . . . it was said that this court was to review the
judgments and decrees “in the same manner and under the same regula-
tions” provided as to the final judgments and decrees of a Circuit Court.
These prior provisions are not repealed, and no jurisdiction ever existed in
this court to review by writ of error or appeal the judgment of a Circuit
Court in a criminal case.107
In deciding Farnsworth in 1889, the Supreme Court seemed to be una-
ware of its decision more than six decades earlier in Buel v. Van Ness.  Conse-
quently, the Court did not attempt to square its straightforward reading of
“in the same manner, and under the same regulations” in the territorial juris-
dictional statute with its earlier contrary reading of the same language in
section 25.
Farnsworth’s holding regarding the absence of Supreme Court review of
territorial criminal cases may be surprising to constitutional lawyers today
whose familiarity with territorial cases comes primarily from the Supreme
Court’s 1878 decision in Reynolds v. United States.108  After all, the Supreme
Court decided Reynolds on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the Terri-
tory of Utah in a criminal prosecution for violating a federal bigamy prohibi-
tion.109  If the Supreme Court did not possess authority to issue writs of error
in criminal cases arising out of the territories, one might wonder how it had
authority to decide Reynolds.  As it turns out, Congress had enacted a special
jurisdictional statute authorizing review of certain criminal cases from Utah,
namely those “where the accused shall have been sentenced to capital pun-
ishment, or convicted of bigamy or polygamy.”110  Absent that statute, the
Supreme Court could not have addressed the Free Exercise Clause issue that
it decided in Reynolds.  In the later-decided case of Snow v. United States
(which involved cohabitation, but not bigamy or polygamy), the Supreme
Court explained that this special jurisdictional provision was inapplicable and
the Court was otherwise unauthorized to exercise jurisdiction to review a
criminal prosecution.111
D. “may proceed to a final decision of the same, and award execution”
There is a final piece of statutory text to consider in section 25.  After
providing that “the writ shall have the same effect” when issued in a state
106 Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U.S. 104, 113–14 (1889) (internal quotations omitted).
107 Id. at 113.
108 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
109 Id. at 150–51.
110 Snow v. United States, 118 U.S. 346, 349 (1886) (describing the provisions of the
special jurisdictional statute).
111 Id. at 351–54.
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court case, “as if the judgment or decree complained of had been rendered
or passed in a circuit court,”112 section 25 authorizes the Supreme Court to
“proceed to a final decision” and “award execution” instead of remanding for
final decision, but only if “the cause shall have been once remanded
before.”113
This statutory language seems to contemplate civil cases only.  If a crimi-
nal defendant prevails on a federal law ground at the Supreme Court after
losing in the state court, the appropriate remedy might be something like
release from prison or a new trial, but the Supreme Court was given no
authority to issue these kinds of remedies when hearing cases via writ of error
in state court cases.  Moreover, the evident purpose of allowing the Supreme
Court to “proceed to a final decision” and “award execution” in cases that
had previously been remanded was to ensure judgment without reliance on a
balky state court.114  It is unclear how that purpose could be served with
respect to a state court that refused to conduct a new trial or to order release
from imprisonment.115
One possibility may be that Congress believed the Supreme Court could
use its section 14 authority to issue writs in aid of its jurisdiction in order to
grant a writ of habeas corpus after jurisdiction attached under section 25.116
The principal difficulty with this argument is overcoming section 14’s explicit
statement that the Supreme Court’s grant of a writ of habeas corpus was lim-
ited to prisoners who are “in custody, under or by colour of the authority of
the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same,
or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.”117
Section 25’s evident concern about Supreme Court mandates to less
than cooperative state courts was no minor matter.  By instructing that the
writ of error should have the same effect in cases from the state courts and
circuit courts, section 25 incorporated section 24’s directive that “the
Supreme Court shall not issue execution in causes that are removed from
112 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 80.
113 Id. This was authority that the Supreme Court used, for example, to get around
Virginia’s intransigence in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 323–24 (1816).
114 See GOEBEL, supra note 65, at 481 (explaining that this provision “was apparently
devised to meet the situation where a judgment or decree of the Supreme Court would not
be executed by a state court and supplementary proceedings in error were brought”).  This
problem was apparently familiar to the Judiciary Act’s principal draftsman and sponsor,
Oliver Ellsworth, who had experienced it in a couple of cases when he was on the standing
committee for hearing prize appeals. See id.
115 This argument was first advanced by Charles Hammond in his Hampden Essay X.
See Hampden X, supra note 33, at 55 (“In a criminal prosecution, the defendant in the state
court, the plaintiff in error in the Supreme Court of the United States, may be imprisoned
under the judgment reversed—he may stand underneath the gallows, as it were, at the
time of reversal—What execution, in such case, could be awarded?  Surely, if the framers of
the act had intended to embrace criminal proceedings, they would have provided for the
liberation of the party whom the judgment of reversal pronounced innocent.”).
116 I thank Jim Pfander for alerting me to this possibility.
117 Ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. at 81–82.
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them by writs of error, but shall send a special mandate to the circuit court to
award execution thereupon.”118  In providing a way around this “special
mandate” method for cases from the state courts, Congress addressed a con-
cern that the Supreme Court’s mandate would not necessarily be viewed as
mandatory by state courts.  And that concern may not have stemmed from a
simple worry that state courts would act unlawfully, but rather from the belief
that the Supreme Court did not have authority to mandate state courts to
award execution.  This was, of course, one of the central issues in Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, but that case was almost three decades away when the Judici-
ary Act was enacted.  And the principal point of Justice Johnson’s separate
opinion in Martin is a disclaimer of this kind of Supreme Court authority
over state courts:
[T]he court disavows all intention to decide on the right to issue compulsory
process to the state courts; thus leaving us, in my opinion, where the consti-
tution and laws place us—supreme over persons and cases as far as our judi-
cial powers extend, but not asserting any compulsory control over the state
tribunals.
As Johnson went on to explain,
the framers of [Section 25] plainly foresaw that the state courts might refuse;
and not being willing to leave ground for the implication, that compulsory
process must be resorted to, because no specific provision was made, they
have provided the means, by authorizing this court, in case of reversal of the
state decision, to execute its own judgment.119
The Supreme Court did not face such a situation in Cohens because it
affirmed the Virginia convictions.  But perhaps it is no coincidence that the
most famous comment about the inability of the Supreme Court to enforce
its own judgments came in a state criminal prosecution.  In Worcester v. Geor-
gia, the Supreme Court reversed the Georgia conviction of Samuel Worcester
for preaching on Indian lands in Georgia without a license from the state.120
Lore has it that Andrew Jackson said of this decision that “John Marshall has
made his decision, now let him enforce it.”121  As it turns out, this lore has
118 Id. at 85.
119 Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 366 (opinion of Johnson, J.).  Justice Johnson
also explained that this concern was only posed by reversals, not affirmances, and he
linked this portion of section 25 with the scope of mandamus authority granted the
Supreme Court in section 13. See id. (“In case of reversal only was this necessary; for, in case
of affirmance, this collision could not arise.  It is true, that the words of this section are,
that this court may, in their discretion, proceed to execute its own judgment.  But these
words were very properly put in, that it might not be made imperative upon this court to
proceed indiscriminately in this way; as it could only be necessary in case of the refusal of
the state courts; and this idea is fully confirmed by the words of the 13th section, which
restrict this court in issuing the writ of mandamus, so as to confine it expressly to those
courts which are constituted by the United States.”).
120 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
121 JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY 111 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-5\NDL504.txt unknown Seq: 28 10-JUL-15 12:27
1894 notre dame law review [vol. 90:5
never been verified.122  But whether President Jackson made this statement
or not, it remains the case that the Supreme Court lacked the ability to
ensure that state courts actually carried out the Court’s judgments.  This was
a problem that Congress had recognized and sought to address, but with
means designed for civil but not criminal cases.
II. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
The affirmative case for civil-only section 25 developed up to this point
has been largely, but not exclusively, textual.  This textual exposition has
already addressed some alternative readings and considered some of the evi-
dence for contrary interpretations of the statutory text.  But there is more to
the cases for and against civil-only section 25 than the prior Part’s clause-by-
clause consideration has thus far revealed.  This Part now takes a broader
view and addresses three of the most powerful objections to a civil-only inter-
pretation of section 25.
A first objection (or cluster of objections) relates to statutory structure,
statutory purpose, and consequences.  The first Congress obviously recog-
nized that state court decisions could undercut the supremacy and uniform-
ity of federal law.  Given that this problem would not be limited to civil cases
and that section 25 was Congress’s way of addressing it, it would make no
sense to limit section 25’s reach to civil cases only.  A second objection is that
the civil-only interpretation of section 25 is too novel or surprising.  If Con-
gress had really limited section 25 to civil cases only, we would not be finding
this out two hundred twenty-five years later.  A third objection is that a civil-
only interpretation of section 25 would mean that Congress acted unconstitu-
tionally by failing to vest some federal court with either original or appellate
jurisdiction in all cases arising under federal law.
The responses to each of these objections vary from each other in their
specifics.  But they have a common thrust, which is to point out how the
objections themselves are rooted in ways of thinking that take for granted the
world that Cohens v. Virginia helped to create.
A. The Objection that Civil-only Section 25 Undercuts Federal Protection for the
Uniformity and Supremacy of Federal Law
We begin with the observation that civil-only section 25 would have left a
hole the size of all state criminal prosecutions in Supreme Court appellate
review.  This leads to an obvious question: Could Congress (possibly or actu-
ally) have intended that?  After all, section 25 prudently provided for
Supreme Court appellate review of state court decisions in which the state
court decided a question of federal law against someone claiming the protec-
tion of federal law.  Why would Congress have provided this type of review for
civil cases only?  Put another way, what reason is there to think that Congress
122 Id. (describing President Jackson’s purported statement as “almost certainly
apocryphal”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-5\NDL504.txt unknown Seq: 29 10-JUL-15 12:27
2015] in  the  beginning  there  was  none 1895
excluded from the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction the review of fed-
eral questions decided against someone invoking the protection of federal
law in state court criminal cases while securing such review in state court civil
cases?
The first point to acknowledge is that an explicit distinction between
civil cases and criminal cases in connection with the scope of review under
section 25 issue never came up in any prominent way during Congress’s con-
sideration of the Judiciary Act of 1789.  The only explicit recorded discussion
of the potential for a state court criminal prosecution to override a federal-
law-based defense that research has revealed was about the possibility of a
state prosecution for violation of an unconstitutional ex post facto law.123
Interestingly, the congressman discussing this possibility relied not on
Supreme Court appellate review as a corrective, but instead on the state
judges’ obligation to abide by their oath to uphold the Constitution.124  The
most explicit documentary evidence against a civil-only interpretation may be
a letter written by Senator Caleb Strong (one of the Act’s drafters) describing
the scope of Supreme Court review in a way that differentiated between civil
and criminal cases for Supreme Court review of federal circuit court deci-
sions, but not for state court decisions.125  It is unclear, though, whether
Strong meant to distinguish on these grounds rather than to describe the
provisions of the Act in a general fashion.126
One reason for the limited discussion of section 25 overall is that the
primary debates over the Act dealt not with the availability of appellate review
of state courts, but the desirability of an extensive system of lower federal
courts.127  Everyone acknowledged the need for lower federal courts in admi-
ralty cases, but opponents of the Act argued that such courts were unneces-
123 See Statement of Rep. Jackson (August 29, 1789), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789–1791: DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FIRST SES-
SION, JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1789, at 1360 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992) [hereinaf-
ter FIRST SESSION DEBATES].
124 Id.
125 See Letter from Caleb Strong (May 24, 1789), in 4 DHSC, supra note 48, at 395, 398
(“Writs of Error from the Circuit to the Supr. Court in all Causes not criminal of which the
Circuit Court has original Cognizance and the Matter in Dispute does not exceed 2000
Dolrs.  If a Cause in a State Court the Question is whether a Law of the State or of the
United States is constitutional and the Judgment is in favor of the State Law or against the
Law of the U.S. a Writ of Error will lie to have that Question & that only determined in the
Supreme Court.  [N]o other power in the federal Courts to revise Judgments in the State
Courts.”).
126 Strong’s generalizations were not entirely accurate even in this section.  In describ-
ing section 25 review, for example, he limited it to state court decisions of constitutionality,
when the provision by its terms reached more broadly. Id.
127 See 4 DHSC, supra note 48, at 30–31 (“[O]pposition to the bill centered on the
proposal to establish a system of federal inferior courts, and the extent of inferior federal
court jurisdiction was an issue that arose almost immediately on the Senate floor.”).  “The
primary debate over the Judiciary Act in the House of Representatives—whose records,
unlike the Senate’s, have been largely preserved—was over a motion introduced by Samuel
Livermore of New Hampshire to eliminate the Senate bill’s provision to create federal
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-5\NDL504.txt unknown Seq: 30 10-JUL-15 12:27
1896 notre dame law review [vol. 90:5
sary for law and equity cases.128  They contended that decision by state courts
with review by the Supreme Court was preferable to decision by lower federal
courts.  Given this opposition strategy, it is understandable that opponents of
the Act did not emphasize any particular limits on the types of state court
cases in which the Supreme Court would exercise appellate review.
Awareness of the way in which opponents of an extensive system of infer-
ior federal courts relied on the availability of appellate review of state courts
enables one to contextualize some of the broadest statements about the avail-
ability of section 25 appellate review.  Representative Jackson of Georgia, for
example, proffered a broad reading of the provision: “Sir, in my opinion, and
I am convinced experience will prove it, there will, nor can be no suit or
action brought in any of the State courts but may under this clause be
reversed or affirmed by being brought within the cognizance of the supreme
court.”129
Yet in the very next sentence after this one, Representative Jackson made
clear that there were some exceptions to the Court’s jurisdiction at present;
his claim was that these limits would eventually be lost.130
Given Congress’s seeming extratextual silence on a civil/criminal dis-
tinction in section 25, one question for an interpreter seeking clues outside
the statutory text is which way this silence cuts.  Given the near-universal
assumption now (and for almost two centuries) that section 25 treats civil
suits and criminal prosecutions alike, one tendency may be to view extratex-
tual silence as cutting against a civil-only interpretation.  But while this ten-
dency is understandable, is it justified?  Two reasons to think not—that is,
two reasons to think that extratextual silence should cut against treating
Supreme Court appellate review of civil suits and criminal prosecutions
alike—is that Supreme Court appellate review of these two types of cases
would have been understood differently in light of two other pieces of sur-
rounding law.
The first of these is the background legal principle that one sovereign
will not enforce the penal laws of another absent a clear statement.  The
standard citation for this principle is St. George Tucker’s 1803 formulation:
district courts, except perhaps for admiralty matters.”  Michael G. Collins, The Federal
Courts, the First Congress, and the Non-Settlement of 1789, 91 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1523 (2005).
128 See 4 DHSC, supra note 48, at 31 (describing the proposed amendment by Virginia’s
Richard Henry Lee, who “moved to limit the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts to
admiralty and maritime cases and to limit ‘federal interference’ to ‘Appeal only from the
State Courts’ to the Supreme Court”).
129 See FIRST SESSION DEBATES, supra note 123, at 1361.
130 Id. at 1361–62 (“But should there be some exceptions for the present, yet Sir, the
precedent is so forcible, for it goes so far as even to admit of constructions that under some
construction or other, of some of the articles, those articles will in time be totally lost.”).
Jackson’s explicit acknowledgment of some “exceptions” to the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction undercuts Professor Amar’s contrary interpretation that “[f]or Jackson, at
least, section 25 was plenary, and covered all arising under cases.”  Amar, supra note 5, at
1558.
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[T]he cognizance of every crime and misdemeanor, whatsoever, committed
within the body of any state, belongs to the courts of that state, in which the
offense is committed, exclusively; unless it can be shewn that a power over the
subject hath been expressly granted to the United States, by the federal
constitution.131
Although Tucker was writing about a different subject than Supreme Court
appellate review of state criminal prosecutions (he was arguing against a fed-
eral common law of crimes), his formulation of this clear statement rule
would encompass Supreme Court appellate review of state criminal prosecu-
tions because subjecting these prosecutions to federal review would destroy
state exclusivity.  If the states had agreed to depart from this default by
authorizing federal review of state court criminal prosecutions for violations
of state law that implicated federal questions, such a departure likely would
have been widely discussed and likely would have been accomplished
expressly.132
And this consideration leads to the second background legal rule, which
is the express text of Article III.  After setting forth the categories of cases or
controversies to which the federal judicial power shall extend, Article III dis-
tributes the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court between original and appel-
late jurisdiction.133  This distribution stipulates that the Supreme Court
should have original jurisdiction over cases “in which a state shall be party.”
Given that the state is a party in criminal prosecutions, an extension of sec-
tion 25 to criminal prosecutions would have placed in the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction a category of cases that Article III distributes to the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.  Perhaps this would have been constitu-
tionally permissible for the reasons later given by Chief Justice Marshall in
Cohens even though they are contrary to his earlier interpretation of the Dis-
tribution Clause in Marbury v. Madison.  But Cohens was over three decades in
the future.  As of 1789, the potential constitutional difficulty with the exten-
sion of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to encompass state criminal
prosecutions should have been apparent.  And yet nobody made an objection
along these lines.
In light of this surrounding law, one reasonable inference from Con-
gress’s extratextual silence on Supreme Court appellate review of state crimi-
nal prosecutions is that nobody believed section 25 authorized such
jurisdiction.  But because there are other reasonable inferences one can draw
131 5 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA App. Note A 10 (1803); see also Anthony J. Bellia Jr.,
Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949, 959–64 (2006) (describing
the general law principle that penal actions are local).
132 See TUCKER, supra note 131, at App. Note A 10.
133 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public min-
isters and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction.  In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such
regulations as the Congress shall make.”).
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as well, it is worth moving beyond legal principles and thinking about practi-
cal considerations that may have shaped Congress’s intentions for section 25
review.  The discussion that follows addresses these practical considerations
as a general matter from the point of view of 1789 and then turns to specific
evidence about how these practical considerations fit into Congress’s shaping
of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Let us first consider space and time.  Geography was an important and
pervasive consideration in the design of the new federal judicial system.  As
Congress considered the Judiciary Act of 1789, it was unclear where the
Supreme Court would sit.134  But wherever that would turn out to be (if
indeed there was to be just one place, which also was not settled), the Court
at any given time would be far away from many people and places.135  There
were no planes, trains, or automobiles; there was no telephone or telegraph.
Supreme Court appellate review would necessarily take weeks or months.
And while these geography-based considerations of space and time would
obviously affect all cases, not just criminal cases, the two kinds of cases are
not created alike.  Civil cases are largely about money and property, while
criminal cases are more often about liberty (and sometimes, life).  Delay is
more tolerable and more fixable with regard to money and property than
liberty (or life).  Also, civil cases are about righting private wrongs, which can
be done over a longer time unlike righting public wrongs, which should be
rectified quickly if they are to be rectified at all.136
Now consider expense, again from the point of view of Congress in 1789.
Congress would have known that Supreme Court appellate review would be
expensive, not only because of space and time considerations (which would
have been more significant in 1789) but also because another layer of litiga-
tion adds another layer of expense (which remains true today despite
improvements in transportation and technology).  Like space and time,
expense-related constraints would affect both civil and criminal cases.  But,
here too, such constraints would play out differently in civil and criminal
cases because appellate review in civil cases, unlike in criminal cases, could be
limited via an amount-in-controversy requirement confining Supreme Court
appellate review to cases where there was a lot of money at stake.  That is,
after all, what Congress uncontroversially did for cases that originated in fed-
eral courts; the Judiciary Act did not provide for appellate review of federal
criminal prosecutions and imposed a two thousand dollar amount-in-contro-
versy requirement for Supreme Court appellate review of civil cases.  And as
explained above, moreover, there is good reason to believe that Congress
treated state court cases similarly by incorporating section 22’s amount-in-
controversy requirement into section 25.
134 Debates over the possible location of the nation’s capital in the first Federal Con-
gress took place while the Judiciary Act was being debated.
135 For a discussion of the influence of uncertainty about location on thinking about
jurisdiction, see Pfander, supra note 18, at 568–72.
136 I thank Marc DeGirolami for drawing my attention to this point.
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Another consideration is the relative paucity of federal law issues that
would have arisen in state criminal prosecutions in the early republic.  This is
an important and underappreciated aspect of the problem.  Even if section
25 had left a hole in federal judicial protection for the uniformity and
supremacy of federal law, the hole was a small one.  Although federal law is
now pervasive in state criminal prosecutions, in 1789 there were very few fed-
eral law issues that Congress would have anticipated arising in state criminal
prosecutions.  Constitutional limits on states in criminal prosecutions were
relatively few prior to incorporation.137  Indeed, all of the “big” modern cases
involving Supreme Court direct appellate review of state criminal prosecu-
tions mentioned in the introduction are about rights that were later incorpo-
rated against the states but inapplicable in state prosecutions until then.  And
while clashes of regulatory authority like that at issue in Cohens were antici-
pated, Congress may not have anticipated that they would come to a head in
criminal prosecutions rather than in civil suits.
A final consideration is that Supreme Court appellate review would have
been only one tool among others that Congress could have used to address
potential problems for federal law that might arise out of state criminal pros-
ecutions.  Given the variety of means Congress could have used to provide
federal judicial protection for federal interests, it is a mistake to infer the
necessity of one particular means (Supreme Court appellate review) from the
desirability of the end alone.
The most obvious alternative to federal appellate review would have
been original jurisdiction in a federal court.  And one way of accomplishing
that would have been pretrial removal of state criminal prosecutions.  That is
how Congress protected federal officers in the first federal officer removal
act, enacted in 1815.138  And as noted above, Congress provided in that stat-
ute for removal of both “suits” and “prosecutions” against certain federal rev-
enue officers.  Although Congress did not provide for removal of state
criminal prosecutions in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress did provide for
removal of suits against aliens subject to an amount-in-controversy require-
ment of five hundred dollars.139  This shows congressional awareness of pre-
trial removal as a tool.  And it was a more powerful tool than appellate
review.  By providing a federal forum for trial, pretrial removal would provide
much greater protection for federal interests than would appellate review via
writ of error, particularly because such review was limited to questions of law
and thus would have left much unreviewable.
Another way that Congress could have protected federal interests
through original federal jurisdiction is by criminalizing interference with fed-
eral functions.  A prosecution for violating this federal criminal prohibition
then could have been pursued in a federal court.  This is how Congress dealt
with the possibility that states would prosecute foreign ambassadors in state
137 The prohibition on ex post facto laws comes to mind, but nothing else, and even
this prohibition was not explicitly limited to criminal laws.
138 See Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198–99.
139 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 79–80.
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court contrary to the exclusive federal jurisdiction over such prosecutions
provided in the Judiciary Act.  Sections 25 and 26 of the 1790 Crimes Bill
provided for a punishment of up to three years’ imprisonment for (among
other things) prosecuting an ambassador, public minister, or their servants,
or bringing legal process to bear on their goods.140
We now turn from general considerations of geography, expense, the
extent of federal law, and Congress’s alternatives in the abstract to a more
specific exploration about how these considerations actually played out in
connection with the enactment of section 25 in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
The paradigm case for section 25 review in the eyes of the Act’s architect
and the author of section 25, Senator Oliver Ellsworth, was a particular kind
of civil case—those involving foreigners.  An August 1789 letter by Congress-
man William Loughton Smith relates a personal conversation in which Ells-
worth explained to him that section 25 was primarily for the benefit of
foreigners whose claims might otherwise have been treated unfairly.141  By its
terms, section 25 review extended more broadly than to claims of foreigners,
of course.  And while it would be inappropriate to limit the provision’s reach
to such claims by pointing to one narrow purpose behind the provision, it is
also helpful to recognize that the paradigm case for section 25 review, in
Ellsworth’s view, involved foreigners.
Among cases involving foreigners, the cases of British creditors played
an outsized role in influencing the shape of federal jurisdiction provided by
140 See Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, §§ 25–26, 1 Stat. 112, 117–18.
141 See Letter from William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 9–10, 1789)
reprinted in 4 DHSC, supra note 48, at 498–99 (“Where is drawn in question the Validity of a
Treaty &ca. you think the appeal should be reciprocal . . . .  The reason on which the
Clause is grounded is that a citizen can’t complain if his own State Court decides against
him; that this Bill does not put him in that respect in a worse plight than he was before: on
the other hand the Clause is absolutely necessary for the preservation of the federal gov-
ernment.  There is much weight in your observation & I am not clear but you are right: my
opinion is not fixed.  Mr. Elsworth who was principally concerned in drawing the Bill is a
Judge of the State of Connecticut of much reputation for legal knowledge: he is a man of
remarkable clearness of reasoning & generally esteemed a person of abilities.  I met him
last night & took notice of some of your objections which he endeavoured to refute.  He
observed that the convention had in view the condition of foreigners when they framed the
Judicial of the U. States.  The Citizens were already protected by [the State] Judges &
Courts, but foreigners were not.  The Laws of nations & Treaties were too much disre-
garded in the several States—Juries were too apt to be biased against them, in favor of their
own citizens & acquaintances: it was therefore necessary to have general Courts for causes
in which foreigners were parties or citizens of different.  States; hence arises this partiality
which offends you: perhaps it may be carried too far.”).  On Founding-era concerns about
state violations of and failures to enforce the law of nations more generally, see Anthony J.
Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 445, 494–507 (2011); Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common
Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29–31 (2009); Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R.
Clark, The Law of Nations as Constitutional Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 729, 758–60 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-5\NDL504.txt unknown Seq: 35 10-JUL-15 12:27
2015] in  the  beginning  there  was  none 1901
the Judiciary Act of 1789.142  Senator Oliver Ellsworth, the Act’s architect,
faced conflicting demands with respect to ensuring a federal forum for Brit-
ish creditors.143  Article IV of the Jay Treaty required the removal of obstacles
to collection of debts held by British creditors, and Ellsworth believed that
Article IV needed to be effectively enforced.144  But Ellsworth also recog-
nized that the creation of a more hospitable alternative for British creditors
might not pass Congress given “strong visceral opposition to the creation of
federal courts that would facilitate British creditors’ debt-collection
efforts.”145  Ellsworth accordingly included a five hundred dollar amount-in-
controversy requirement in the circuit courts’ alienage and diversity jurisdic-
tion, a dollar amount that barred “the great majority of British claims from
the new federal courts.”146  “Because of its impact upon the British debt
cases,” Casto argues, “the five-hundred dollar limitation was the most signifi-
cant compromise in Ellsworth’s bill.”147
One way that concerns about the claims of British creditors may have
influenced the scope of section 25 review directly is through the two thou-
sand dollar amount-in-controversy requirement in section 22 that appears to
have been incorporated into section 25 through its “in the same manner and
under the same regulations” language.  And the way in which this happened
is linked to concerns about the cost of Supreme Court appellate review.  In a
section-by-section markup of the proposed judiciary bill accompanying a July
1789 letter from Virginia’s Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, Pendleton
drew an explicit connection between the costs of appeal and an amount-in-
controversy requirement for section 25.  In his comments on section 25, Pen-
dleton wrote: “[S]hould there not be some limitation of the sum for will not
the Clause embrace the Case of every British Creditor?  And is it intended
that they may drag every [debtor] for the most triffling sum first thro’ the
State Courts & then by Appeal to the seat of Congress.”148
142 See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUS-
TICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 51–52 (1995); Wythe Holt, “To Establish Jus-
tice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1421.
143 On Ellsworth as “father” of the Judiciary Act, see Letter of William Loughton Smith
to Edward Rutledge (July 5, 1789) reprinted in 69 S.C. HIST. MAG. 1, 10 (1968) (describing
Ellsworth as the “father” of the Act, who “defends every clause valiantly”); MACLAY’S JOUR-
NAL (Edgar Maclay ed., 1890) (“This vile bill is a child of [Ellsworth’s], and he defends it
with the care of a parent, even with wrath and anger.”); see also WILLIAM R. CASTO, OLIVER
ELLSWORTH AND THE CREATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 60 (1997) (“In addition to being
the formal chairman of the Committee, his fellow senators viewed [Ellsworth] as the ‘lead-
ing projector’ of the judiciary measure.  It was Ellsworth’s bill.”).
144 CASTO, supra note 142, at 46.
145 Id. at 52.
146 Id. at 47.
147 Id.
148 Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (July 3, 1789) reprinted in 4
DHSC, supra note 48, at 444, 448.
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Although William Casto has argued persuasively that the five hundred
dollar amount-in-controversy limitation for circuit court original jurisdiction
was “the most significant compromise in Ellsworth’s bill,” he does not extend
his insights into the centrality of concerns about British debtors to considera-
tion of the higher amount in controversy governing the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction.  Casto does not address Pendleton’s perspective, argu-
ing that appellate review of state court decisions was available in theory
regardless of the amount in controversy but would not be pursued in practice
because of expense.149  Yet the “costs of appeal” argument cuts both ways,
and the threat of an appeal by a party with superior resources was a concern
at the time, as Pendleton’s comment reveals.  Nor was Pendleton’s worry
about British creditors dragging debtors through the courts for trifling sums
baseless.  True, the limitation of section 25 review to legal issues of federal
law (via the writ of error) would have prevented many appeals from having
legal efficacy—as the debtors largely relied on unreviewable jury determina-
tions that the debtors had sufficiently paid and that the creditors were not
entitled to interest.150  But the costs of litigation were high, and the threat of
an appeal and costly legal process would have strengthened the creditors, as
Pendleton recognized.  If section 25 had not incorporated section 22’s
amount-in-controversy requirement, then there would have been a way back
into federal court for British creditors with low dollar value debts, and this
option would have affected settlement values even if rarely exercised because
of expense.
The importance of Pendleton’s perspective on the desirability of an
amount-in-controversy requirement should not be underestimated.  During
the same session that Congress considered the first Judiciary Act, it also con-
sidered the first set of constitutional amendments.  And one of those amend-
ments dealt with a proposed amount-in-controversy requirement for
Supreme Court appellate review.  The need to have an amount-in-contro-
versy requirement for Supreme Court appellate review had been a lingering
concern in Virginia dating back to the ratification debates.  During those
debates, Edmund Randolph had identified “the two most material defects” of
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Article III as the Court’s
“appellate jurisdiction as to fact, and in trivial sums.”151  Notably, Randolph’s
linkage of these two issues together is mirrored in a two-part constitutional
amendment proposed by Madison during the first Congress.
As proposed by Madison, the amendment providing an amount-in-con-
troversy limitation for Supreme Court appellate review was written to be
149 See CASTO, supra note 142, at 47 (“In theory, Supreme Court appellate review was
available to correct errors in the tremendous number of British claims relegated to the
mercy of state judiciaries.  In practice, however, an appeal all the way to the Supreme
Court would have been prohibitively expensive in comparison to the size of the claim.”).
150 See F. THORNTON MILLER, JURIES AND JUDGES VERSUS THE LAW: VIRGINIA’S PROVINCIAL
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, 1783–1828, at 40–43 (1994).
151 See 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: VIR-
GINIA, NO. 3, at 1455 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino, eds., 2009).
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inserted in Article III, section two, at the end of the second clause—immedi-
ately after the provision authorizing congressional “regulations” of the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  The amendment provided that “no
appeal to such court shall be allowed where the value in controversy shall not
amount to ____ dollars: nor shall any fact triable by jury, according to the
course of common law, be otherwise re-examinable than may consist with the
principles of common law.”152
The second part of this proposed amendment made it into the provision
that became the Seventh Amendment, and is now known as the Re-examina-
tion Clause.  But as Madison explained in a letter to Edmund Pendleton writ-
ten ten days before Congress finally adopted the Judiciary Act, the
constitutional amount-in-controversy amendment failed in the Senate.153
One of the reasons the proposed amendment failed was a concern that it
could exclude Supreme Court consideration of important federal questions
that arose in cases under the amount-in-controversy requirement.154  One
might view this reason for the failure of a constitutional amount-in-contro-
versy requirement as a reason for rejecting a civil-only reading of section 25.
After all, important federal questions had the potential to arise in criminal
cases as much as civil cases.  But this neglects the most radical significance of
the amount-in-controversy requirement, which is that it presupposed a civil-
only understanding of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
Understanding the failed constitutional amount-in-controversy require-
ment is important also because the statutory amount-in-controversy require-
ment for Supreme Court appellate review in section 22 may have been a
consolation prize for those who supported the constitutional amendment.
The original Senate bill included a two thousand dollar amount-in-contro-
versy requirement for Supreme Court appellate review of circuit court deci-
sions, but only in cases that had come up from the district court to the circuit
courts.  The original version of the Act did not include an across-the-board
amount-in-controversy requirement until a House amendment extended it to
Supreme Court appellate review of all federal circuit court decisions.155
This amendment also explains what otherwise is puzzling about Pendle-
ton’s July 1789 letter to Madison proposing an amount-in-controversy
requirement for section 25.  If section 25 incorporated section 22’s amount-
in-controversy requirement, as argued above, then why would Pendleton
152 Letter of James Madison to Edmund Randolph (May 31, 1789), reprinted in 5 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON: 1787–1790, at 372, 379 (Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1904).
153 Letter of James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 14, 1789) reprinted in 4
DHSC, supra note 48, at 511.
154 Letter of James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 23, 1789), reprinted in 4
DHSC, supra note 48, at 517 (explaining that “[i]t will be impossible I find to prevail on
the Senate to concur in the limitation on the value of appeals to the Supreme Court, which
they say is unnecessary, and might be embarrassing in questions of national or constitu-
tional importance, tho’ of small pecuniary amount”).
155 See 4 DHSC, supra note 48, at 79. (“The House made one very important amend-
ment [to Section 22], extending the $2,000 limitation on appeals to the Supreme Court to
all cases instead of just those originating in the district court.”).
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have suggested the addition of such a requirement?  The answer is that the
version reviewed by Pendleton, which was the original Senate bill, had not yet
included an across-the-board amount-in-controversy requirement for
Supreme Court appellate review in section 22.  And section 25 was always
parasitic on section 22.  Only after this two thousand dollar amount-in-contro-
versy requirement applied to all circuit court cases in which section 22 pro-
vided for Supreme Court appellate review might this requirement have been
understood as a regulation of jurisdiction incorporated by section 25’s “in
the same manner and under the same regulations” language.
If section 25 incorporated section 22’s amount-in-controversy require-
ment, then the constitutional amendment proposed by Madison was not a
total failure.  For the amount-in-controversy requirement that the Senate
rejected as a constitutional matter would have made it into the Judiciary Act
of 1789 as a statutory matter.  This makes the civil-only presupposition of the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Article III that was built into
the proposed constitutional amendment less surprising.  After all, as we have
seen, the Act itself explicitly confined the Supreme Court’s appellate review
of cases from the federal courts to civil cases only.
Having reviewed the most important aspects of Congress’s consideration
of the Judiciary Act for what it might reveal of a civil/criminal distinction in
section 25, the fairest conclusion seems to be that broader considerations
beyond the text of the Judiciary Act of 1789 are not decisive one way or other
regarding the civil-only interpretation of section 25.  But the evidence for a
civil-only interpretation is much stronger and the evidence for a combined
civil and criminal reach is much weaker than commonly thought.  Although
it is tempting to argue against the more limited, civil-only understanding of
section 25 by appealing to a broad purpose to protect the supremacy of fed-
eral law, that kind of argument risks being overly simplistic and somewhat
anachronistic.  In establishing the federal judiciary in such a way as to ensure
the supremacy of federal law, Congress needed to compromise and consider
not only other interests, but also other ways of protecting federal supremacy
apart from direct appellate review.  The bitter disputes over the relationship
between state and federal courts in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee and over expan-
sive federal legislative power in cases like McCulloch v. Maryland and Cohens v.
Virginia are such a prominent part of the story of section 25 that it is easy to
forget that the concerns behind section 25 were different in 1789.   While
some opponents of the Judiciary Act included section 25 in their opposition,
it was a largely uncontroversial provision.  Congress’s concern was focused on
particular federal interests, with special attention devoted to conflicting
demands regarding the claims of British creditors.  Preservation of federal
interests through federal court adjudication was always in recognized tension
with other interests, and Congress imposed important limitations on the
reach of Supreme Court appellate review to accommodate these conflicting
interests.
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B. The Objection that Civil-only Section 25 Is Too Novel to Be Right
A second objection flows from the understandable impulse to think that
it just cannot be right that we are only now finding out about the correct
interpretation of section 25.  If the arguments for civil-only section 25 are so
good, why were they not more apparent to interpreters around the time of
Cohens v. Virginia?  And why have they not only been ignored but forgotten
and buried after Cohens?
Before answering these questions, it is important to be clear about the
limits of the objection.  The civil-only interpretation is novel in the sense that
it has not occurred to anyone for almost two centuries to examine whether it
might be right.  But the civil-only interpretation is not completely new; the
arguments set forth in Part I are rooted in arguments made at the time of
Cohens and earlier.  The “novelty” objection, therefore, is about novelty in the
present, which in turn translates into questions about why the civil-only inter-
pretation of section 25 was not more carefully considered around the time of
Cohens, and why it was completely forgotten once the furor over Cohens died
down.
The best way to address these questions is probably to consider them
from the perspective of the important actors around the time of Cohens v.
Virginia.  Let us begin by considering the silence of Virginia’s lawyers.  They
were seemingly best positioned in Cohens to make the argument that the
Supreme Court lacked statutory jurisdiction to engage in appellate review via
writ of error in state court criminal prosecutions.  These lawyers had been
specifically instructed to argue that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction,
and the jurisdictional issue only; if the Court were to decide that it possessed
jurisdiction (as it did), these lawyers were to go home (as they did) rather
than argue the merits.156  One might think that this charge would have made
the lawyers especially attentive to arguments for no statutory jurisdiction.  But
Virginia’s opposition to Supreme Court review was constitutionally based; to
argue that Congress had simply failed to provide for appellate jurisdiction in
a category of cases for which Article III authorized jurisdiction would have
been in tension with Virginia’s position on the scope of Article III.157
156 See LUCE, supra note 10, at 121.
157 Two other reasons that Virginia’s lawyers may not have raised the statutory jurisdic-
tion arguments analyzed in this Article can be seen by considering how those arguments
would have related to other arguments advanced by Virginia.  First, the argument about
the limited ordinary meaning of “suit” set forth above would have been in tension with
Virginia’s argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred Supreme Court appellate review
in Cohens—that the writ of error was a “suit” prosecuted against the state in violation of the
Eleventh Amendment.  Second, a bad statutory jurisdiction argument may have crowded
out the good ones.  In order to advance their merits argument while honoring the instruc-
tion only to argue jurisdiction, Virginia’s lawyers reframed their merits argument in juris-
dictional terms.  They argued (unconvincingly) that section 25 did not authorize
jurisdiction because its authorization was limited to claims denying rights protected by
federal law, but the federal statute at issue did not actually authorize the selling of lottery
tickets (for which the Cohens were prosecuted).
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A similar dynamic may have been at work at the Supreme Court, albeit
in reverse.  Dismissal for lack of statutory jurisdiction in Cohens would have
been an unsatisfactory half measure even if the Court could have secured its
jurisdiction under Article III.  Particularly in light of the absence of any party
raising the arguments about statutory jurisdiction set forth above, there was
no reason for the Court to dig too deeply into the issue.158  Were the Court
to have concluded that it lacked statutory jurisdiction over state criminal
prosecutions, it is doubtful that Congress would have extended jurisdiction
any time soon even if Article III permitted it.  And this was an unattractive
prospect, for the Court did not simply need jurisdiction, but jurisdiction that
it could exercise immediately.159
This talk about the Supreme Court as a single entity, though, is not
entirely satisfying even if accurate.  For the Court is a collectivity—a “they,
not an it.”160  And the member of the collectivity best positioned to appreci-
ate the problem with statutory jurisdiction, Justice William Johnson, has left
us only with confounding silence on the civil-only understanding of section
25 that he had advanced just five years earlier.  Under the leadership of Chief
Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court spoke most of the time with just
one voice—Marshall’s.  Justice Johnson was an exception, the only Marshall
Court justice who wrote separately in constitutional cases to any significant
degree.161  Given Johnson’s unusual willingness (for the Marshall Court) to
write separately, why did he not write separately in Cohens to explain how his
views on Supreme Court jurisdiction over state-court criminal prosecutions
had seemingly changed from just five years earlier?  This remains a mystery.
It is noteworthy, though, that Cohens came in the middle of a four-year period
beginning in 1819 in which Justice Johnson largely stopped writing separate
opinions altogether.  Justice Johnson’s biographer suggests that Johnson’s
158 This is not to say that the Court would have been disabled from reaching the issue.
The Supreme Court’s 1805 determination that it lacked jurisdiction to review criminal
prosecutions from the D.C. Circuit Court came after sua sponte questioning from Chief
Justice Marshall. See United States v. More, 7 U.S. (1 Cranch) 169 (1805) (“The Chief
Justice suggested a doubt about whether the appellate jurisdiction of this court extends to
criminal cases.” (emphasis omitted)).
159 The idea that high stakes in a legal dispute may result in blindness to lower stakes
dispositions may be another still-valuable lesson illustrated by this Article’s consideration of
civil-only Section 25.  Maybe the low practical stakes of a civil-only Section 25 today will
render scholars more willing to consider its legal correctness notwithstanding the impor-
tance of the interpretation in either strengthening or weakening existing theories about
the Judiciary Act of 1789 and Article III.
160 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the
Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONT. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005).
161 See DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON: THE FIRST DISSENTER, THE
CAREER AND CONSTITUTIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF A JEFFERSONIAN JUDGE 176 (1954) (“[W]ith
the sole exception of William Johnson, no member of the Marshall Court during the years
prior to 1823 spoke out in separate opinions, whether concurring or dissenting, in more
than eight cases.”); id. at 179 (noting that Johnson “contributed exactly half of the concur-
ring and half the dissenting opinions delivered by all the judges between his advent and
the close of the 1822 term”).
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dissatisfaction with his job and his work on a book-length biography of
Nathaniel Greene may explain some of his silence.162  Whatever the causes
may have been, correspondence with Jefferson later shook Johnson out of his
silent streak, and he was back writing separately in important cases starting in
1823.163  In none of those later opinions, however, does Johnson explain his
seeming about-face on statutory jurisdiction for Supreme Court appellate
review of state criminal prosecutions.
Another possibility is that nobody directly involved in Cohens took time
to read section 25 carefully and explore the relationship of its language with
other provisions of the Act.  After all, it was not until 1823 in Beul that the
Supreme Court confronted the question of section 25’s incorporation of sec-
tion 22’s amount-in-controversy requirement.  Alexander Dallas’s 1814 letter
to Congress shows that the incorporation reading was not idiosyncratic to
Charles Hammond.  Yet nobody appears to have made this argument directly
to the Court until William Wirt advanced it in Beul.  It is intriguing to specu-
late whether Wirt, who represented the Cohen brothers in Cohens, might
have picked up this incorporation argument from Hammond’s post-Cohens
newspaper essays.  (Indeed, Wirt might have been one of the likely few peo-
ple to have actually read through all of those essays.)
Widespread neglect of arguments in favor of civil-only section 25 is
much easier to explain after Cohens.  Given the Court’s decision in that case
with respect to constitutional jurisdiction and its unproblematic acceptance
of statutory jurisdiction, any post-Cohens argument that section 25 did not
extend to criminal cases would not have been given much of a chance by
experienced counsel.  Perhaps this is why Georgia, which later argued for a
lack of statutory jurisdiction under section 25 on other grounds in Worcester v.
Georgia,164 did not advance an argument along these lines.
If one can understand why the civil-only understanding of section 25
held little allure in the world of practice, what explains the neglect of schol-
ars since then?  One explanation is disciplinary.  Legal historians tend not to
frame their inquiries in a way that would yield the narrowly legal argument
that section 25 review did not, as a matter of law, authorize Supreme Court
appellate review of state criminal prosecutions.  Although academic lawyers
are more open to considering a hard-edged legal claim like this, many lack
the historical background to recognize the strength of the legal arguments
insofar as they depend on understanding the text of section 25 in historical
context.  But specialists in federal jurisdiction who have extensively studied
the original meaning of Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789 are familiar
enough with the historical context to evaluate this Article’s arguments about
civil-only section 25.  What about them?
The best explanation for the existing consensus probably has Cohens
itself at bottom.  Once one accepts Cohens’s interpretation of Article III to
encompass Supreme Court appellate review of state criminal prosecutions
162 See id. at 180.
163 See id. at 168–89.
164 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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involving federal questions, it is hard to imagine that Congress did not pro-
vide for statutory jurisdiction over such cases.  Because one cannot fathom
why Congress would have left such a gap between constitutionally authorized
and statutorily provided jurisdiction, scholars have never before set out to
examine whether Congress did so.  One can see this mindset at work, for
example, in Felix Frankfurter’s and James Landis’s The Business of the Supreme
Court—a book at the headwaters of legal scholarship on federal jurisdiction
for the past several decades.  Frankfurter and Landis describe the Judiciary
Act of 1789 as providing the Supreme Court with statutory “appellate jurisdic-
tion over all classes of cases which constitutionally could be reviewed.”165
Nor is civil-only section 25 the sort of statutory interpretation that one is
likely to casually alight upon.  The arguments in support of this interpreta-
tion are well grounded in statutory text, but that text is remarkably dense.
Moreover, those who do inspect the full original text of section 25 now might
not fully understand the import of its language without considering it both in
its larger statutory context and in the wider legal universe of the late eight-
eenth century.  One needs a guide from the time like Charles Hammond, but
Hammond is now obscure and one can only find his statutory arguments by
reading through the tenth of his eleven essays on Cohens.
Many scholars of federal jurisdiction may never have even read section
25 all the way through, much less considered how its parts interact with other
sections of the Judiciary Act of 1789.  The leading federal courts casebook
devotes almost half a page to setting forth the text of section 25 in its early
summary of jurisdiction provided under the Act, and even that version is
highly abbreviated, leaving out most of the statutory language discussed
above (viz. “any suit,” “in the same manner and under the same regulations,”
and “may . . . proceed to a final execution”).166  Although the casebook’s
later discussion of Supreme Court appellate review of state court decisions
does include an annotated version of the entire statutory text, the annota-
tions do not indicate when all of the different pieces of statutory text dis-
cussed in Part I were amended into their present form.167  And in fact, there
was no single amendment that eliminated all these different pieces, which
rather melted away over time in a series of amendments, none of which were
intended to expand a civil-only reading to include criminal prosecutions.
165 FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 13 (1927) (emphasis added).  These distinguished
scholars did not even qualify this claim by noting the absence of Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over federal court criminal prosecutions.  And yet the linkage between statu-
tory and constitutional jurisdiction is still credited by scholars today who recognize that
limitation. See CROWE, supra note 121, at 39 & n.12 (citing Frankfurter and Landis for the
proposition that the Judiciary Act granted “appellate jurisdiction over all classes of cases—
both from lower federal courts and state courts—that [constitutionally] could be
reviewed”).
166 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 25 (6th ed. 2009).
167 Id. at 431–32.
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In the end, the novelty associated with resurrecting the dead and buried
civil-only interpretation of section 25 is reason to proceed with caution.  But
the arguments for and against the interpretation can stand on their legal
merits regardless of whether they are familiar or forgotten.
C. The Objection that Civil-only Section 25 Is Unconstitutional
In addition to the objections from statutory purpose and novelty,
another type of objection is that Section 25 would be unconstitutional if lim-
ited to authorizing Supreme Court appellate review of state cases denying
federal-law-based rights in civil cases only.  This objection can be formulated
in constitutional avoidance terms: Because leaving the Supreme Court with-
out authority to engage in appellate review of state criminal cases denying
federal-law-based rights would be unconstitutional, an interpretation that
yields such an outcome should be avoided if reasonably possible.168
An initial question facing this objection is whether a reading of section
25 to include appellate review of state criminal prosecutions is reasonably
possible.  This is a harder question now than it would have appeared before
one had considered the arguments set forth in Part I.  In order to conclude
that it is reasonably possible to understand section 25 as including review of
state criminal prosecutions, an interpreter would not only need to interpret
“any suit” to encompass a state criminal prosecution, but also would have to
exclude the amount-in-controversy requirement from incorporation and to
ignore the civil-only implications of the provision authorizing award of execu-
tion.  Each one of these interpretive moves is questionable on its own; put-
ting them all together is unlikely to be right.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to
conclude that the operative understanding of section 25 for decade upon
decade to include criminal prosecutions is not a reasonably possible interpre-
tation of the language.
The next question is how hard to strain to avoid the potential constitu-
tional problem.  This, in turn, depends on whether there is any constitutional
problem to avoid.  That is, the force of any constitutional avoidance objec-
tion to a civil-only interpretation of section 25 obviously depends on the
force of the underlying argument for unconstitutionality.  If arguments for
mandatory Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state criminal prosecu-
tions resolving questions of federal law are unsuccessful, then this unconstitu-
tionality objection to civil-only section 25 dissolves.
This Article about section 25 is not the place for a full airing of the
arguments for and against the various mandatory theories that would render
section 25 unconstitutional.  The extent of congressional control over federal
court jurisdiction is one of the most extensively examined topics in the schol-
arly literature of federal courts; well known and well developed arguments
168 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012) (opinion
of Roberts, C.J.) (“[I]f a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the Con-
stitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so.”).
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have been presented with thoroughness and care by many other scholars.169
Rather than rehearse or reshuffle these, I will simply report my own present
conclusion that the various mandatory theories under which civil-only section
25 would be unconstitutional are unpersuasive, largely for textual reasons
expounded by Professor John Harrison,170 historical reasons elaborated by
Professor Daniel Meltzer,171 and the original meaning of “all cases” most
recently set forth by Judge William Fletcher172 (though much earlier set
forth by Charles Hammond in his commentaries on Cohens).173
Rather than allow a constitutional avoidance reason to distort what oth-
erwise seems to be the correct, civil-only interpretation of section 25, it is
more fruitful to consider how that interpretation fits into the existing debate
over congressional control of federal jurisdiction.  Arguments about the exis-
tence, size, and reasons for various gaps between constitutionally authorized
and statutorily provided jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789 are a staple
of arguments among various interpreters of Article III.  Some influential fed-
eral courts scholars have argued for a mandatory understanding of “arising
under” jurisdiction, such that Congress is obligated to provide federal court
jurisdiction in some form over every case that arises under federal law.  And
other influential scholars defending the old orthodoxy of virtually plenary
congressional control over federal jurisdiction have argued in response that
these mandatory theories are inconsistent with the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which provided substantially less federal jurisdiction than these theorists con-
tend Congress was constitutionally obliged to provide.
Civil-only section 25 provides new arguments for the old orthodoxy in
this ongoing scholarly debate.  To see precisely how it does so, consider Akhil
Amar’s position in The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789.174  In
that article, Amar defends his mandatory two-tier interpretation of Article III
(an interpretation of Article III that he developed from earlier arguments by
Joseph Story).  Under Amar’s interpretation of Article III, there are three
categories to which the federal judicial power extends for which Congress
169 It is as easy as it is pointless to multiply authorities here. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of
Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012).  The first footnote of an article on this very topic from
almost twenty years ago, for example, cited thirty articles (with authors from Amar to
Young) for the proposition that “[t]he extent of Congress’s authority to control the juris-
diction of the federal courts has been the subject of unending academic debate.”  Julian
Velasco, Congressional Control over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Traditional View,
46 CATH. U. L. REV. 671, 671–72 n.1 (1996).  For a relatively recent overview of the state of
the debate, see James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitu-
tionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191 (2007).
170 Harrison, supra note 8.
171 Meltzer, supra note 21.
172 William A. Fletcher, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: The Mean-
ing of the Word “All” in Article III, 59 DUKE L.J. 929 (2010) (explaining that the function of
“all cases” in Article III’s description of the extent of federal judicial power is to enable
discretionary vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts).
173 See CHARLES HAMMOND, No. III, reprinted in REVIEW OF THE OPINION, supra note 15.
174 Amar, supra note 5.
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must provide for federal jurisdiction, and six categories for which Congress
may provide for federal jurisdiction.  Cases arising under federal law are in
the mandatory tier (together with admiralty cases and cases affecting ambas-
sadors and public consuls).  Against those scholarly critics who see inconsis-
tency between this interpretation of Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789,
Amar argues that “[i]n its general structure and in a great many of its specific
provisions, the Act validates the main tenets of Story’s two-tier thesis, as
revised and elaborated [by Amar] in 1985.”175  With respect to section 25 in
particular, Amar argues that “the Supreme Court was given plenary appellate
review, under the famous section 25, over all state court decisions which defeated
rights set up by the appellant under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States.”176  Contrasting the Judiciary Act’s treatment of “arising
under” cases with diversity cases later in the article, Amar writes that “when
Congress turned to federal question appeals from state courts to the U.S.
Supreme Court under section 25, it chose a truly de minimis amount-in-dis-
pute requirement: zero.”177  But because section 25 did not provide for
appellate review of state criminal prosecutions, and further restricted review of
judgments in civil suits through a two thousand dollar amount-in-controversy
requirement on top of that, Amar’s claims about section 25 are mistaken.
And his claim of fundamental consistency between the Judiciary Act of 1789
and a mandatory theory of Article III that encompasses “arising under” juris-
diction is incorrect.
Although Amar’s claims about the Judiciary Act of 1789 and Article III
have attracted powerful criticisms from scholars such as Daniel Meltzer and
John Harrison, those scholars also appear to have accepted the received
understanding of section 25’s reach to encompass criminal cases and to
include no amount-in-controversy requirement.178  For example, Meltzer dis-
cusses the gap between section 25 and Article III resulting from section 25’s
limitation to denials of rights protected by federal law, but he does not
address either the civil-only reading of section 25 or the incorporation of an
amount-in-controversy requirement from elsewhere in the Act.  And Harri-
son explicitly asserts that “Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . provided
for federal appellate jurisdiction over state criminal prosecutions in some
circumstances.”179
In the end, the ultimate validity of various mandatory theories of Article
III should probably turn on considerations other than correspondence with
the Judiciary Act of 1789.  This is so even if one shares Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s view in Cohens that the actions of the first Congress provide a contem-
175 Id. at 1516.
176 Id. at 1519 (emphases added); see also id. at 1529–30 (asserting that, in section 25,
“Congress sought to obey the obligation to vest plenary ‘arising under’ jurisdiction in fed-
eral courts”).
177 Id. at 1520.
178 See Harrison, supra note 8; Meltzer, supra note 21.
179 Harrison, supra note 8, at 234.
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poraneous exposition of the Constitution that is of great authority.180  That
authority should not defeat a clean argument from constitutional text, after
all, any more than would a mistaken interpretation in the Federalist Papers.
And Congress could have erred, or could have been disorganized or con-
fused.181  This has been known to happen.  In any event, the objection from
unconstitutionality usefully reveals how interpretations of section 25 plug
directly into ongoing scholarly debates—debates thus far conducted without
any consideration of the arguments tending to establish that section 25 did
not authorize Supreme Court appellate review of state criminal prosecutions.
III. BEYOND CIVIL-ONLY SECTION 25
The responses to various objections considered in the preceding Part
have already begun to reveal the present-day import of this Article’s examina-
tion of civil-only section 25.  This Part expands beyond section 25 and the
Judiciary Act of 1789 to consider broader implications of the surprising redis-
covery of civil-only section 25.  At a general level, the possibility—indeed, the
strong likelihood—that the first Congress did not authorize Supreme Court
direct appellate review of state criminal prosecutions resulting in the rejec-
tion of a federal-law-based right, immunity, or defense matters now precisely
because it fits so uneasily with much of what we think we know about the estab-
lishment and development of federal jurisdiction.  While this Article’s claims
about civil-only section 25 can be joined seamlessly into the ongoing schol-
arly debates about congressional control over federal jurisdiction, the more
interesting and potentially wide-ranging import of the arguments for civil-
only section 25 is for debates that have yet to happen or are in areas of schol-
arly concern distinct from seemingly narrow and technical legal questions
about the interpretation of this single statutory provision.
Writing as Publius, Alexander Hamilton observed in Federalist No. 82
that
[t]he erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may distin-
guish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and nicety; and
these may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow from the establish-
ment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial incorporation of a
number of distinct sovereignties.182
Hamilton was talking there about Article III.  And it is no coincidence.  The
judiciary was particularly prone to generating such “questions of intricacy
and nicety” because the Constitution did not completely constitute the fed-
180 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 263, 420 (1821).
181 See, e.g., Laurence Claus, The One Court that Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity,
Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59, 104 (2007) (“The history of the [Judiciary] Act’s
adoption confirms what the Act’s chaotic structure suggests: that the Judiciary Act might
better be described as exhibit A for proving the first Congress’s discord and failure to read
Article III coherently.”).
182 THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 282 (Alexander Hamilton) (2005).
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eral judiciary, but left significant details of the structure to be devised by
Congress.183
Congress began this process in the Judiciary Act of 1789.  But it took a
course of over three decades before something as basic as “arising under”
jurisdiction was judicially liquidated into the form that it has taken to this
day.184  The need for this course of adjustment and clarification was under-
stood at the beginning.  Hamilton’s observation in Federalist No. 82 identi-
fied a category of questions raised but not resolved by the Constitution.  For
Hamilton did not assert that the Constitution itself would supply answers to
all the “questions of intricacy and nicety” that would arise in working out the
relationship between federal and state courts.  He asserted, instead, that it
would take time and future developments to determine the answers: “[it] is
time only that can mature and perfect so compound a system, can liquidate
the meaning of all the parts, and can adjust them to each other in a harmoni-
ous and consistent whole.”185  In stating this, Hamilton echoed James
Madison’s earlier observation, also written as Publius, that “[a]ll new laws,
though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and
most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equiv-
ocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particu-
lar discussions and adjudications.”186
Cohens v. Virginia was a crucial decision in this process of constitutional
liquidation.  This Article is not the occasion for a full examination of the
correctness of the Court’s constitutional reasoning.  But the significance of
that reasoning is unquestionable.  Even if the ultimate determination of con-
stitutional jurisdiction in Cohens was correct under Article III, Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion for the Court resolved a number of tensions in Article III
that could have been resolved other ways even while reaching the same out-
come.  These alternative resolutions, in turn, could have led to a very differ-
183 As one scholar recently put it,
[e]ffectively functioning as ‘a compromise by postponement,’ the defining fea-
ture of Article III is the way in which the framers of the Constitution essentially
placed the institutional structure of the judiciary in the hands of Congress,
thereby making it inevitable that debate about the structure of the federal judici-
ary would reemerge in the course of ordinary politics in the future.
CROWE, supra note 121, at 27 (citations omitted).
184 The Marshall Court’s enduring opinion on “arising under” jurisdiction is Osborn v.
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), which itself was shaped in impor-
tant respects by Cohens v. Virginia. See generally CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUS-
TICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 124 (1996) (describing Cohens and Osborn as
opinions that “elicited the chief justice’s most elaborate inquiries into the constitutional
foundations and extent of federal judicial power”).
185 THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra note 182, at 282.  For an extensive recent discussion
of constitutional liquidation, see Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwrit-
ten Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1797.  Another in-depth treatment of the practice appears in
Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003).
186 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 122 (James Madison) (2005).  It is perhaps no coinci-
dence that Madison was also speaking in this paragraph about jurisdiction.
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ent operative understanding of Article III than is now embedded in
jurisdictional doctrine.  For example, Cohens decided that Article III’s distri-
bution of state-party cases to the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction did
not apply to cases arising under federal law.187  That interpretation is proba-
bly contrary to the original legal meaning of the Distribution Clause.188
Without this aspect of Cohens, original jurisdiction suits against states based
on claims arising under federal law might have been more prominent.  Or, to
pick another example, Cohens determined that there were some cases “arising
under” federal law that could not be within the original jurisdiction of a fed-
eral court because they could only originate in a state court.189  That inter-
pretation, too, may be contrary to the original legal meaning of Article III.190
If this part of Cohens had come out differently, pretrial removal of criminal
prosecutions raising federal questions may have been a more widely used
tool.
The suggestion that there was no statutory jurisdiction in Cohens indicates
a potentially significant divergence between the clear constitutional vision ani-
mating the Chief Justice’s opinion and competing constitutional understand-
ings in the first Congress that ended up partially embedded in various ways in
the Judiciary Act of 1789.  And recognizing that a holding of no statutory
jurisdiction provides a path not taken makes it easier to understand that
Cohens did not have to turn out as it did.  Although scholars have been able
to piece together the original legal meaning of various portions of Article III
187 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 393–94 (1821) (“When . . . the constitu-
tion declares the jurisdiction, in cases where a State shall be a party, to be original, and in
all cases arising under the constitution or a law, to be appellate—the conclusion seems
irresistible, that its framers designed to include in the first class those cases in which juris-
diction is given, because a State is a party, and to include in the second, those in which
jurisdiction is given, because the case arises under the constitution or a law.”); id. at
398–99 (“[T]he original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in cases where a State is a
party, refers to those cases in which, according to the grant of power made in the preced-
ing clause, jurisdiction might be exercised in consequence of the character of the party,
and an original suit might be instituted in any of the federal Courts; not to those cases in
which an original suit might not be instituted in a federal court.”).
188 See Pfander, supra note 18.
189 Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 394 (“That the constitution or a law of the United
States, is involved in a case, and makes a part of it, may appear in the progress of a cause, in
which the Courts of the Union, but for that circumstance, would have no jurisdiction, and
which of consequence could not originate in the Supreme Court.  In such a case, the juris-
diction can be exercised only in its appellate form.  To deny its exercise in this form is to
deny its existence, and would be to construe a clause, dividing the power of the Supreme
Court, in such manner, as in a considerable degree to defeat the power itself.  All must
perceive, that this construction can be justified only where it is absolutely necessary.  We do
not think the article under consideration presents that necessity.”).
190 As explained above, William Fletcher and Charles Hammond have argued that the
original meaning of “all cases” in Article III’s description of the extent of federal judicial
power is to enable discretionary vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. See
generally HAMMOND, supra note 173; Fletcher, supra note 172.  The assertion that there can
be no appellate-only jurisdiction is a corollary of this claim.  Federal jurisdiction that is
appellate-only cannot be exclusive.
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notwithstanding tension between their findings and various aspects of the
Court’s opinion in Cohens, the rediscovery of civil-only section 25 should
prompt the question: What else might we currently be missing because of the
difficulty imagining a federal jurisdictional structure without Cohens—that is,
all of Cohens—as a foundation?
To appreciate the nature of this problem, it is helpful to shift from the
idea of constitutional liquidation to the concept of constitutional construc-
tion.191  This shift enables us to better conceptualize the difficulty facing
those interested in discerning the original legal meaning of Article III while
living in the world that Cohens made.  It is akin to the difficulty in discerning
the original design in smudged architectural drawings after someone else has
already constructed a beautiful and functional building from those drawings.
After this construction has stood the test of time, interpreters of the original
drawings cannot help but have their understanding of the smudged drawings
formed to some degree by what was actually built.  Such is the influence of
the enduring Marshallian construction of Article III in Cohens v. Virginia.
This influence can be counteracted by careful attention to pre-construc-
tion sources.  And it also helps to have a knowledgeable guide.  That is where
Charles Hammond comes in.  Hammond’s neglected arguments about civil-
only section 25 were in just one of his eleven essays on Cohens v. Virginia; the
other ten were about the Constitution.  By recovering, developing, and
defending Hammond’s claims about section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
this Article establishes Hammond’s chops as an analyst of federal jurisdiction
and lays the groundwork for recovering Hammond’s important contributions
as a constitutional lawyer and analyst of federal jurisdiction.
Having excavated, reconstructed, and augmented Charles Hammond’s
arguments for civil-only section 25, it is fitting to conclude with a discussion
of this Article’s method and scope.  This Article’s core claim about the lim-
191 This concept is deployed in a variety of ways in contemporary constitutional theory,
but one commonality in all such uses is to distinguish “construction” from “interpretation.”
Lawrence Solum uses the interpretation/construction distinction to mark the difference
between determination of semantic meaning (interpretation) and determination of legal
effect (construction). See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010).  Thus understood, construction happens in every case that
involves the application of a legal text, even when the legal meaning mirrors the semantic
meaning precisely. See id. at 107–08.  The earlier usage by Keith Whittington and Randy
Barnett is narrower.  In that usage, “interpretation” refers to the process of ascertaining
textual meaning (with no distinction drawn between semantic content and legal content),
while “construction” refers to the way in which insufficiently determinate text is given a
legal meaning sufficiently determinate for the purpose at hand (such as judicially resolving
a case). See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 123 (2004)
(“When the abstract terms of the Constitution do not directly resolve a particular dispute,
some construction (as opposed to interpretation) of constitutional meaning is need.  As
Whittington observes, constructions operate ‘where the text is so broad or so
underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful but exhaustive reduction to legal rules.’”
(quoting KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 5 (1999)).  Although
not rejecting the semantic/legal distinction identified by Solum, this Article uses “con-
struction” in the narrower sense of “rendering sufficiently determinate.”
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ited reach of section 25 is a legal claim supported by legal arguments.
Although this Article should be of some interest to legal historians of the
early Republic through Jacksonian democracy, it is primarily a work of legal
analysis rather than historical investigation.  It is the kind of claim that a his-
torically oriented academic lawyer might make; legal historians, as historians,
tend to adopt a broader focus for their inquiries and more tentative conclu-
sions about specific legal claims.  And while the primary audience for the
Article consists of scholars of federal jurisdiction and others interested in
legal analysis related to the development of federal jurisdiction, it is atypically
narrow for that kind of scholarship.  These features of the analysis are worth
addressing explicitly.
The narrowness of this Article’s frame for analysis is a feature, not a
limitation.  It shows how unrelenting focus on a single legal question about
the reach of a single statutory provision can provoke the revisitation of
aspects of the federal jurisdictional structure long taken for granted.  And in
the end, the biggest puzzle about section 25’s application to state criminal
prosecutions that this Article uncovers for legal historians is not about
whether that application was authorized under section 25 as originally
enacted and understood.  It either was or it was not, and that’s that.  A bigger
question for legal historians is how the more limited civil-only understanding
of section 25 evident as late as 1816 in Justice Johnson’s separate opinion in
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee and readily available to Hammond in 1821 was over-
taken so quickly and so definitively that it not only has been lost to genera-
tions looking backwards from the present, but also was not even deployed by
others who wanted to limit Supreme Court jurisdiction during the 1820s and
onwards.  The best explanation for this effacement of section 25’s apparent
original meaning lies in the realm of legal history.  But it is not something
that legal historians have tried to explain, because they, like their scholarly
confreres in the more narrowly legal field of federal courts scholarship, have
not recognized the civil-only meaning of section 25 whose effacement
requires explanation.
As this Article illustrates by example, the text of section 25 provides an
excellent entry point into certain legal perspectives that were operative in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries but are all but lost today.
Careful consideration of this statutory provision unsettles the assumptions
that we bring to Article III today by revealing how the first Congress
addressed the relationship of the Supreme Court to state courts at a level of
legal detail far more precise than the broad language of the Constitution.
Yet the development of a comprehensive new understanding of either the
Judiciary Act of 1789 or Article III is not an independent objective in this
Article.  That is a worthy ambition, but the object of this Article is different in
kind: To reveal an important and heretofore unappreciated legal datum that
every such theory must account for.
Like the narrowness of its substantive focus, the resolutely legal frame of
this Article’s analysis is also a feature, not a defect.  If forced to place a mod-
ern methodological label on the interpretive approach adopted in this Arti-
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cle, the fairest label would probably be some variety of textualism.  But this
kind of labeling can occasionally obscure more than it reveals, and this may
be one of those instances.  The intent behind this Article’s interpretive
approach is to argue in a manner self-consciously continuous with the kinds
of legal arguments that Charles Hammond made in 1821, not to demonstrate
deftness in deploying or fidelity in following a particular interpretive
approach.  Hammond’s arguments were standard lawyers’ arguments, made
before self-conscious interpretive -isms proliferated in the twentieth century.
In both form and substance, these arguments have a remarkable durability
over time.  And it is this durability that allows inquisitive lawyers almost two
centuries later, coming at the question with a vastly different set of supposi-
tions about federal jurisdiction, to nevertheless recognize the strength of
Hammond’s legal arguments as such.  Durability over time and ability to
induce acceptance notwithstanding deep differences in presuppositions may
be features of the arguments adduced in the predominantly textualist
approach in this Article.  But a demonstration of the merits or demerits of a
particular interpretive -ism is at most a byproduct of the interpretive
approach adopted rather than an independent objective.
The particular combination of durability and evanescence, as well as rel-
ative strength and weakness, of legal arguments like Charles Hammond’s
reveals an interesting phenomenon of legal reasoning.  Implicit in the claims
not only that Hammond was correct, but also that his correctness can be
appreciated today is a claim about the ability of legal reasoning of the sort
deployed by Hammond and in this Article to yield recognizably sound con-
clusions despite decades and decades of change.  Yet this assumed feature
juxtaposes harshly with the evident truth that Hammond’s arguments had no
apparent practical effect at the time he wrote and disseminated them.
The conclusion to Hammond’s Hampden essays includes an expression
of hope that “the judges themselves” would be “among the ‘few persons’ who
will take the pains to read what I have written.”192  The essay series ends with
an affirmation of the “right of the citizen to expose what he views as an erro-
neous doctrine” and an assertion of the corresponding duty of judges to
attend to critical examinations of their opinions:
I am far removed from personal acquaintance, or personal collision with any
of them.  My lot in life is too humble, my station too obscure even to come
into personal contact with them, or to hope any thing personal from thus
publicly questioning their correctness.  It is the right of the citizen to expose
what he views as an erroneous doctrine, no matter by what public function-
ary it is advanced.  It is the duty of all public men to give attention to every
examination of their opinions, & to derive improvement from it—That the
judges of the supreme court will make every proper use of this review, I
entertain no doubt.  But for this consideration, I might well regard the
whole as labor thrown away.193
192 See CHARLES HAMMOND, No. XI, reprinted in REVIEW OF THE OPINION, supra note 15, at
61.
193 Id.
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This is a poignant conclusion in light of the apparent irrelevance of
Hammond’s arguments about Cohens v. Virginia during his lifetime.  In the
grand sweep of the law, though, Hammond’s labors were not wasted.  His
essays and other constitutional writings preserve a vision of section 25 and of
Article III that may have otherwise been permanently buried under the com-
peting constructions erected by Chief Justice Marshall for the Supreme Court
in Cohens.  It will profit us to attend now and in the future to what Hammond
wrote then.
CONCLUSION
If this Article’s core claim about section 25 is correct, every casebook,
treatise, scholarly work, and so on that purports to provide an account of
what Congress did in section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 must be
changed.  In particular, those accounts must come to grips not only with the
possibility that the appellate review authorized in section 25 did not encom-
pass state criminal prosecutions but also that section 25 included an amount-
in-controversy requirement.  Put another way, the strong version of the revi-
sionist interpretation of section 25 offered in this Article matters every time
that getting it right about section 25 matters.  For a foundational statute like
the Judiciary Act of 1789, getting section 25 right matters for a number of
issues and in a range of ways.  And while the weak version of this Article’s
core claim does not directly address the “correct” interpretation of section
25, it nevertheless opens up a new perspective on the Marshall Court’s con-
struction of Article III.
Perhaps most profoundly, even if only diffusely, evaluation of the argu-
ments for civil-only section 25 may induce greater epistemic humility on the
part of scholars seeking to understand Article III and the development of
federal jurisdiction.  From 1789 through 1820, the Supreme Court of the
United States decided hundreds of cases, including a few dozen appeals from
state courts.  All of these state court appeals were in civil suits; none were in
criminal prosecutions.  If one were asked to provide a full account of
Supreme Court appellate review of state criminal prosecutions from the
beginning of the Supreme Court’s existence all the way through the Chief
Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth, and halfway through John Mar-
shall’s, only three words would be needed: There was none.  It is notewor-
thy—if one pauses to think about it—that the Supreme Court sat for over
three decades before it first engaged in direct appellate review of a state crim-
inal prosecution turning on a question of federal law.  Yet lawyers, judges,
and scholars have largely ignored the pre-history of Supreme Court review of
state criminal prosecutions.  Sometimes, it seems, the obvious can blind.
